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ARIEL KATZ AND EDEN SARID* 
According to popular and scholarly belief, video killed the radio star. The 
golden age of radio, culminating in the 1930s and 1940s, was gone with the 
rise of television in the 1950s and 1960s. In this Article, we advance the claim 
that television’s role in the “death” of the radio star has been more limited than 
commonly believed. A major culprit, we argue, is the common licensing practice 
of musical content for broadcasting, or more precisely, the blanket license issued 
by copyright collective management organizations (CMOs). By setting a zero 
marginal price for broadcasting additional songs from the CMO’s repertoire, 
CMOs’ blanket licensing drives commercial radio stations to dedicate a larger 
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portion of their programming to the broadcasting of recorded songs and to reduce 
the time and resources spent on producing or procuring other content. 
This Article makes three main contributions to three fields: competition law 
and policy; copyright law and policy; and cultural history. For competition law 
and policy, this Article reveals that the analysis of blanket licenses should not be 
limited to their static effects (i.e., the trade-off between lower transaction costs 
and supra-competitive pricing), but should also include the dynamic effect of 
blanket licensing on the type and quality of content production. This dynamic 
effect also poses a challenge for copyright law and policy: while collective 
licensing may be beneficial to one class of copyright holders, it may hinder the 
production of other content and harm creators of such content, by depriving 
them of important opportunities for market and cultural participation. 
Regarding cultural history, our Article provides a novel explanation for the well-
documented phenomenon of the “death” of the radio star and re-evaluates some 
of the existing explanations. Finally, we discuss some alternative models for 
music licensing that can mitigate the distortion created by blanket licenses. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is commonly thought that video killed the radio star.1 The golden 
age of radio, when programming “made ‘em laugh, [and] made ‘em 
cry, [and] made us feel like we could fly” was gone with the rise of 
television, and ever since, “all we hear is radio ga ga.”2 This view is not 
limited to popular culture. Scholarly literature often credits the 
growing popularity of television in the 1950s and 1960s with being one 
of the main causes for the demise of radio.3 But could this be a case of 
false conviction? In this Article, we advance the claim that television’s 
role in the “death” of the radio star has been more limited than 
commonly believed and that a major culprit is still at large. 
That major culprit, as the next pages argue, is the common licensing 
practice of musical content for broadcasting, or more precisely, the 
blanket licenses issued by copyright collective management 
organizations (CMOs). CMOs’ blanket licensing, we maintain, drives 
commercial radio stations to dedicate a larger portion of their 
programming to the broadcasting of recorded songs and to reduce the 
time and resources spent on producing or procuring other content. 
While not as popular as it was in its heyday, radio is still very 
popular. Indeed, every week, more Americans tune into radio than 
watch television or use smartphones, computers, or tablets.4 On 
average, Americans listen to radio for more than two hours per day, 
which supports a nationwide industry of more than 15,000 stations 
 
 1. THE BUGGLES, Video Killed the Radio Star, on THE AGE OF PLASTIC (Island Records 
1980). 
 2. QUEEN, Radio Ga Ga, on THE WORKS (EMI 1984). 
 3. See infra Part III. 
 4. See How America Listens: The American Audio Landscape, NIELSEN (Apr. 5, 2018), 
https://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/article/2018/how-america-listens-the-
american-audio-landscape [https://perma.cc/M72B-S75T] (explaining that 93% of 
Americans tune into radio at least once a week, compared to 88% who watch television, 
83% who use smartphones, and 50% who use personal computers). 
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that gross over twenty billion dollars in total annual revenue.5 The 
vast majority of these stations broadcast mostly music.6 Similarly, in 
Canada, according to a recent Canadian Radio-Television and 
Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) report, radio continues 
to be the main audio distribution platform for music, news, and 
narrated content despite the growth of online platforms.7 Music is 
crucial for radio broadcasting both as an input and as an output: 
broadcasters need music to create shows that they then broadcast to 
their audience. Copyright law requires broadcasters to obtain 
permission from the copyright owners of the musical works, but 
broadcasters rarely obtain it from the copyright owners directly. 
Rather, most copyright musical works are administered by CMOs 
that act on behalf of the right-holders and provide users, such as 
radio broadcasters, the requisite licenses in a centralized manner.8 
In the United States, there are three major CMOs: the American 
Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), Broadcast 
Music, Inc. (BMI), and the Society of European Stage Authors and 
Composers (SESAC).9 A fourth collective, Global Music Rights (GMR), 
was founded in 2013.10 Licensing by CMOs prevails all over the world, 
 
 5. Radio Industry Revenue in the U.S. 2012–2021, STATISTA (Jan. 8, 2021) 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/259981/radio-industry-revenue-in-the-us (noting 
the total revenue in 2019 is estimated at $23.26 billion); see also Press Release, FCC, 
Broadcast Station Totals As Of March 31, 2019, (Apr. 2, 2019), https://docs.
fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-356801A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/L93U-WNUK] 
(providing that in 2019 there were 4,613 AM stations, 6,762 FM commercial stations, 
and 4,139 FM educational stations in the United States, totaling 15,514 stations). 
 6. Radio Listening By Format, RADIO ADVERTISING BUREAU, http://www.rab.com/
whyradio/reportresults.cfm (last visited Oct. 5, 2021) (choose “Radio Listening by 
Format” from “Report Type” dropdown; then click “Submit”) (showing that news, 
sports, and all talk radio stations are a minority of stations compared to the large variety 
of music-specific stations). 
 7. AM/FM Radio-Harnessing Change: The Future of Programming Distribution in 
Canada, CANADIAN RADIO-TELEVISION & TELECOMM. COMM’N (May 5, 2018) [hereinafter 
CRTC Future Programming], https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/publications/s15/a3.htm. 
 8. See Daphne A. Bugelli & Daniel J. Gervais, How Collective Management 
Organizations Remunerate Musicians Worldwide: A Guide for U.S.-Based Songwriters and 
Performers, 9 LANDSLIDE 56, 57 (2017). 
 9. Stanley M. Besen et al., An Economic Analysis of Copyright Collectives, 78 VA. L. 
REV. 383, 385 (1992). 
 10. GLOBAL MUSIC RIGHTS, https://globalmusicrights.com/About [https://
perma.cc/AYG2-CRFE]. 
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except that in most countries the system is even more centralized and 
involves a single CMO.11 In Canada, for example, licenses are provided 
by the Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada 
(SOCAN).12 Each CMO administers a catalog of works and saves users 
and right-holders the need to negotiate with each other directly.13 
CMOs negotiate licenses, collect fees, and distribute the collected fees 
to the right-holders.14 In the early 2000s, ASCAP and BMI accounted 
for approximately 97% of all U.S. public performance rights income, 
and royalties paid by radio and television broadcasters alone 
represented 80% of ASCAP and BMI’s total revenues.15 
CMOs typically issue blanket licenses, which allow licensees to use as 
many works in the CMOs’ repertoire as many times as they wish in 
return for a license fee. The license fee may be a fixed amount, or, in 
the case of commercial radio, calculated as a percentage of the 
station’s advertising revenue.16 The license fee is calculated 
independently from the number of works actually used, the number of 
times each work is played, or the song’s popularity.17 Blanket licenses 
are often credited with providing several advantages: they economize 
transaction costs, provide users with certainty from involuntary 
infringement, and effectively price each additional performance of a 
work at its effective marginal cost (of zero).18 However, blanket licenses 
 
 11. Id. at 398 (1992); Ariel Katz, The Potential Demise of Another Natural Monopoly: 
Rethinking the Collective Administration of Performing Rights, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 
541, 542, 558 (2005) [hereinafter Rethinking]. 
 12. See Licensing, SOC’Y COMPOSERS, AUTHORS & MUSIC PUBLISHERS CAN., 
http://www.socan.com/what-socan-does/licensing [https://perma.cc/GPG2-6LT4] 
(explaining that music users pay SOCAN a yearly fee and that fee is distributed to 
SOCAN Members, primarily composers, authors, and music publishers). 
 13. Michael A. Einhorn, Intellectual Property and Antitrust: Music Performing Rights in 
Broadcasting, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 349, 350 (2001). 
 14. See Bugelli & Gervais, supra note 8, at 57 (explaining that CMO’s license music 
for users while relieving authors and songwriters from the need to individually 
negotiate each licensing contract for his or her works). 
 15. Einhorn, supra note 13, at 349–50, 355. 
 16. Id. at 353. 
 17. Besen et al., supra note 9, at 388; Einhorn, supra note 13, at 350; Ivan Reidel, 
The Taylor Swift Paradox: Superstardom, Excessive Advertising and Blanket Licenses, 7 N.Y.U. 
J.L. & BUS. 731, 733, 743 (2011) (noting that blanket licenses “price fame no differently 
than obscurity”). 
 18. Einhorn, supra note 13, at 350; WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 386 (2003). 
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have several disadvantages as well. For example, the all-or-nothing 
regime drives most users to “buy more music than they want at a price 
[that] . . .  may well be far higher than what they would choose to 
spend for music in a competitive system.”19 
The literature on CMOs tends to focus on an inherent trade-off that 
underlies CMOs’ operations. On the one hand, CMOs offer users a 
convenient way to obtain licenses and allow members to take advantage 
of economies of scale by reducing the costs of negotiating and granting 
licenses, collecting license fees, monitoring compliance with license 
terms, and enforcing against infringement.20 On the other hand, 
collective administration of copyright leads to the elimination of price 
competition between copyright owners, the concentration of market 
power in the hands of monopolistic CMOs, and the potential abuse of 
such power.21 
Due to their anticompetitive potential, CMOs and their practice of 
blanket licensing have attracted regulatory and legal scrutiny.22 In the 
United States, antitrust law has provided the dominant instrument of 
regulatory oversight of CMOs.23 This oversight is carried out through 
judicially enforced consent decrees.24 Other countries sometimes use 
other models such as administrative bodies that oversee the tariffs 
 
 19. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 31–32 
(1979)(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 20. E.g., Ariel Katz, The Potential Demise of Another Natural Monopoly: New Technologies 
and the Administration of Performing Rights, 2 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 245, 253 
[hereinafter New Technologies] (2006). 
 21. See, e.g., id. at 261; Besen et al., supra note 9, at 397–98; Denis De Freitas, 
Copyright and Music, 114 J. ROYAL MUSICAL ASS’N 69, 79 (1989); Christian Handke & 
Ruth Towse, Economics of Copyright Collecting Societies, 38 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. AND 
COMPETITION L. 937, 943 (2007); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., COPYRIGHT AND THE MUSIC 
MARKETPLACE: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 41 (2015); see also Kristelia A. 
Garcia, Penalty Default Licenses: A Case for Uncertainty, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1117, 1123 
(2014) (suggesting that while licenses for music broadcasting are deemed to increase 
certainty and stability and therefore efficiency, uncertainty can actually be utilized to 
increase efficiency in the marketplace). 
 22. Besen et al., supra note 9, at 395; Einhorn, supra note 13, at 351. 
 23. Katz, Rethinking, supra note 11, at 546. 
 24. See Besen et al., supra note 9, at 405 (explaining that the U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of New York oversees license fees to ensure that collectives set 
reasonable fees); see also Einhorn, supra note 13, at 354–56 (providing a detailed a 
history of the consent decrees and the judicial oversight). 
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proposed by CMOs and their related terms and conditions.25 For 
example, in Canada, to “protect users from the potential exertion of 
unfair market power by collective societies,”26 the Copyright Act27 
empowers the Copyright Board to oversee the proposed tariffs and 
their related terms and conditions28 and to ensure that such tariffs are 
“fair and equitable.”29 
In this Article, we add a novel dimension to the analysis of CMOs’ 
costs and benefits. We illustrate that blanket licenses distort cultural 
production in radio broadcast by causing radio broadcasters to 
increase their broadcasting of pre-recorded music and to reduce the 
quantity of other types of content. In other words, CMOs’ blanket 
licenses channel resources towards the (copyright) music industry and 
away from the production of other content. This claim will be 
discussed in length below, but here it is in a nutshell. 
Commercial radio broadcasters generate most of their revenue by 
selling advertisement time,30 and their capacity to attract high-paying 
advertisers depends on their ability to attract and keep listeners. 
Therefore, broadcasters attempt to assemble an optimal mix of 
content that appeals to the tastes of as many listeners as possible in 
their targeted audience. Radio broadcasters can air two kinds of 
content: music and narrated shows.31 In assembling the content mix, 
beyond the selection of music and narrated shows, broadcasters 
consider whether to produce their content in house or to commission 
outside production and whether to use live or pre-recorded content.32 
 
 25. Besen et al., supra note 9, at 405. 
 26. York Univ. v. Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access Copyright), 2021 
CanLII 32, para. 67 (Can. S.C.C.). 
 27. Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-42, s 70(1) (Can.). 
 28. Id. 
 29. York Univ. v. Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access Copyright), 2021 
CanLII 32, para. 44 (Can. S.C.C.). 
 30. Jesse Holcomb & Amy Mitchell, Revenue Sources: A Heavy Dependence on 
Advertising, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Mar. 26, 2014), https://www.pewresearch.org/
journalism/2014/03/26/revenue-sources-a-heavy-dependence-on-advertising 
[https://perma.cc/S4RW-N5AG]. 
 31. We do not consider advertisements as content in the context of cultural 
production. Therefore, we do not discuss them here, though they are indeed a 
broadcast output. 
 32. We define “narrated content” as any kind of primarily verbal content even if 
music or sound is played in the background. 
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In order to maximize profit, commercial broadcasters wish to 
broadcast the content that will yield the highest net revenue (gross 
revenue minus the cost of producing or procuring the content).33 
Accordingly, a commercial radio station will choose any particular 
content based on the marginal net revenue it may earn by playing that 
piece of content.34 
Thus, in a competitive market for content, if a broadcaster chooses 
to broadcast a particular musical work, it does so because it expects 
that the net revenue from broadcasting that work will be higher 
relative to what it expects to earn from broadcasting any other content, 
be it another musical work or narrated shows. 
However, music is rarely obtained in a competitive market. Rather, 
the permission to broadcast most musical works is typically granted by 
CMOs through blanket licenses. Since blanket licenses follow an all-
you-can-eat model, the price of broadcasting any additional musical 
work from the CMOs’ repertoire is essentially zero. By contrast, 
broadcasting any content not covered by the CMOs’ repertoire would 
require incurring an additional positive cost. This creates a strong 
economic incentive for profit-maximizing commercial broadcasters to 
maximize the use of musical works from the CMOs’ repertoire and 
to minimize the broadcasting of other content. In other words, 
because the marginal cost of broadcasting another song under the 
blanket license is zero, all things equal, the broadcaster will prefer 
broadcasting another song over equally attractive piece of content 
that is not part of the blanket license. 
Such an incentive will be familiar to anyone who ever dined in a 
fixed-menu restaurant. Suppose, for example, that a restaurant offers 
a fixed-menu lunch that includes a choice of chocolate, vanilla, or 
strawberry ice cream for dessert. If you choose the fixed menu, you are 
more likely to choose an ice cream flavor from the fixed menu, even if 
you might have chosen another ice cream flavor or another type of 
dessert altogether had you not chosen the fixed-menu option. You will 
also be more likely to have this restaurant’s ice cream, even though 
otherwise you would very much prefer that of the nearby artisanal 
gelato shop. You may choose the fixed-menu dessert not because you 
 
 33. Paul Audley & Marcel Boyer, The “Competitive” Value of Music to Commercial Radio 
Stations, 4 REV. ECON. RSCH. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 29, 32 (2007). 
 34. Id. at 32. 
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like it the best, but because with the fixed menu you can have that ice 
cream at zero additional cost, while choosing any other ice cream 
would require additional payment. Therefore, even though the fixed-
menu ice cream gives you less pleasure than other ice creams, the net 
benefit from having it (i.e., the pleasure minus the cost) may be 
greater. 
While the fixed menu may change diners’ consumption patterns, 
these changes are not likely to have any market or industry-wide effect 
given the highly competitive nature of the dining industry and the 
many options from which diners can choose. 
This is not the case with music and radio programming, where in 
many instances, a CMO’s blanket license is the only viable option for 
broadcasters. Consequentially, the blanket license scheme can, and 
indeed does, distort cultural production in commercial radio 
broadcast by creating a very strong incentive to maximize the airtime 
dedicated to music and reduce the demand for, and supply of, other 
types of content. This licensing practice may benefit one class of 
creators (songwriters whose music is licensed by CMOs or the music 
publishers who often hold the copyrights in such music), at the 
expense of other creators such as creators of narrated content, or 
writers whose music is not licensed by CMOs. This practice also harms 
the listening public because it leads radio stations to forego the 
broadcasting of content that could result in greater listener 
satisfaction. 
The distortion of cultural production in commercial radio broadcast 
by blanket licenses provides a novel explanation to two phenomena in 
radio broadcast. The first is the remarkable shift in cultural production 
in radio that took place in the 1950s. Until then, the primary content 
on radio was narrated shows, generally produced in house and 
broadcast live. However, since the 1950s, the primary content being 
broadcast on commercial radio became pre-recorded (blanket-
licensed) music, and the majority of narrated content radio became 
ad-libbed talk shows. The second is the notable difference in the 
programming currently offered by commercial and public 
broadcasters. While the former mainly offer pre-recorded music and 
very little narrated content, the latter offer more varied programming 
that includes less pre-recorded music and more narrated content. To 
demonstrate our assertion, we analyze the shifts in radio broadcast in 
the 1950s as well as current differences in cultural production patterns 
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in public and commercial radio. We then evaluate different possible 
options for licensing music broadcast on radio to establish a clearer 
picture of possible licensing options as well as their advantages and 
shortcomings.  
So far, discussions around CMOs have mainly focused on their ability 
to charge supra-competitive prices or impose onerous conditions on 
users. This Article, however, identifies another anticompetitive aspect 
of CMOs’ blanket licenses: distortion in the content of cultural 
production. This effect has not yet garnered sufficient attention in the 
scholarly assessment of collective administration and in the legal and 
regulatory responses toward this phenomenon. We hope that this 
Article will draw such attention.35 
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I presents a simple economic 
model explaining how blanket licensing of music affects cultural 
production in commercial radio broadcasting. Part II provides a brief 
history of radio broadcasting and a description of cultural production 
in radio throughout radio’s prime (1920s-1950s). We then describe the 
changes that the radio broadcast industry experienced in the 1950s. 
We examine the existing explanations to these changes and note that 
blanket licenses could explain why we witnessed these particular 
changes, and not others. We then turn to clarify why the industry felt 
the impacts of blanket licenses in earnest only in the 1950s, and not 
prior. Part III compares current cultural production patterns in public 
and commercial radio. We demonstrate that commercial radio offers 
a different product than public radio and explain that this may be 
a consequence of blanket licensing. In Part IV, we outline different 
options for administration of musical works. We discuss advantages 
and shortcomings of the different options and suggest that certain 
options might alleviate the distortion in cultural production and 
conceivably maintain many of the advantages of collective 
administration. The Article concludes with a call to action for 
 
 35. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 32 (1979) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (“Because the cost to the user is unaffected by the amount used on any 
program or on all programs, the user has no incentive to economize by, for example, 
substituting what would otherwise be less expensive songs for established favorites or 
by reducing the quantity of music used on a program. The blanket license thereby 
tends to encourage the use of more music . . . .”). 
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considering new models for licensing music for radio 
broadcasting. 
I.    BLANKET LICENSES’ EFFECT ON CONTENT: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
In this Part, we offer an economic analysis of CMOs’ blanket licenses 
and their impact on cultural production in commercial radio 
broadcasting. Radio broadcasters offer a mix of music and other 
content. We argue that blanket licenses distort the production of 
content by causing broadcasters to increase the amount of airtime 
dedicated to music at the expense of other content. Additionally, 
blanket licenses direct more resources into the pockets of CMOs and 
their members and away from other creators. As such, CMOs’ practice 
of issuing blanket licenses presents a challenge not only to competition 
policy but also to copyright and cultural policy. 
Under a CMO’s blanket license, a broadcaster pays the same amount 
(either a flat fee or a percentage of its revenue or a combination 
thereof) regardless of how many songs it plays from the CMO’s 
repertoire or how many times it plays them. In that sense, the blanket 
license provides an example of two-part pricing: it comprises an access 
charge to the CMO’s entire repertoire and a variable charge at a rate 
of zero for additional performances.36 Therefore, once the broadcaster 
obtains a blanket license, the marginal price of playing any song under 
the blanket license is zero.37 And since the cost of broadcasting an 
existing pre-recorded song approximates zero too, some economists 
view the practice of collective licensing and the use of the blanket 
license as welfare enhancing: it expands the output of broadcast music 
relative to other forms of licensing.38 
William Landes, for example, maintains that in addition to lowering 
transaction costs, by setting the marginal price of songs at zero, CMOs’ 
blanket licenses expand output compared to direct licensing where a 
broadcaster would license songs and pay on a per-song, per-
 
 36. William M. Landes, Harm to Competition: Cartels, Mergers and Joint Ventures, 52 
ANTITRUST L.J. 625, 634 (1983). 
 37. At least the copyright-related component of the cost. The blanket license will 
not affect other costs that the broadcaster has to incur in order to broadcast songs. We 
discuss some implications of this distinction infra, in Part II. 
 38. Landes, supra note 36, at 634. 
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performance basis.39 Accordingly, Landes argues CMOs and their 
blanket licenses are procompetitive output-expanding beneficial joint 
ventures.40 Richard Posner makes a similar point. He described ASCAP 
and BMI as “benign cartel[s]” because even though the fee a licensee 
pays for the blanket license is higher than what the licensee would pay 
if composers competed among themselves, that higher fee does not 
cause the licensee to play less music because it allows them to play as 
many songs as they wish at no additional cost.41 
These observations and their enthusiastic embrace of the blanket 
license, however, miss a few important points. We agree that generally, 
a decrease in the price of a widget will result in greater consumption 
of that widget or in increased production of gadgets that incorporate 
widgets as input. However, the production function of a radio station 
is somewhat different. While songs are inputs in the production of 
radio programs, a radio station cannot simply respond to a decline in 
the price of songs by buying more inputs and broadcasting more 
programs. For one thing, there are only sixty minutes in an hour and 
only twenty-four hours in a day, so a lower marginal price for songs 
does not imply that a radio station can expand the number of songs it 
plays. No matter how expensive or cheap any song is, the radio station 
can only play a limited number of them at any given time. Since the 
average length of a song is three and a half minutes long,42 then a radio 
station can play no more than seventeen songs per hour. The blanket 
license would be output expanding only if the cost of direct licensing 
prevented the radio station from profitably securing licenses for the 
content that it wished to broadcast and forced the radio station to 
reduce its broadcasting time. Otherwise, the blanket license would 
have no quantitative effect on the radio station’s total output. 
Although, as we argue, it would affect the composition of that output. 
Second, a lower price per song will not necessarily result in a lower 
price for and greater consumption of the radio station’s product—the 
broadcast program. The marginal cost of listening to a broadcast is 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 632. 
 41. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 30 (2d ed. 2001). 
 42. Daniel Sanchez, What’s the Average Length of a Song? It’s Shorter Than You Think, 
DIGIT. MUSIC NEWS (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2019/01/18/
streaming-music-shorter-songs-study. 
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already zero, and there is no price/cost constraint on the number of 
people who can listen to the program so long as they are located within 
the range of reception of the broadcast signal. The number of listeners 
will be determined predominantly by the quality of the programming, 
which is measured by the station’s ability to broadcast content that 
attracts listeners. 
Therefore, while we agree with Landes and Posner that the blanket 
license reduces the marginal cost of broadcasting songs covered by the 
license and therefore encourages radio stations to play more of those 
songs, we disagree with their conclusion that the blanket license is 
output expanding and hence procompetitive. This conclusion 
supposes that songs under the CMO’s blanket license are the only 
content that the radio broadcaster could profitably broadcast (and 
therefore a lower per-song price would result in greater output of 
broadcast content). However, if there is other content that the radio 
station could profitably play, then the blanket license for music 
reduces the price of music relative to other content. But this change in 
the relative prices of inputs may have greater impact on the quality of 
the broadcaster’s output than on its quantity; it drives the radio station 
to broadcast more music from the CMO’s repertoire while reducing 
the production and broadcast of other content, which they would 
otherwise broadcast. This is the central claim of this Article, which we 
now turn to explore in greater detail. 
Since their programs are broadcast over-the-air for free, 
commercial radio broadcasters’ revenue depends almost exclusively 
on advertising.43 In turn, advertisers’ willingness to pay depends on 
the size and type of a radio station’s audience.44 Therefore, radio 
broadcasters will attempt to curate content that they hope will 
attract the largest number of listeners from a targeted demographic. 
As noted, often, this will consist of a mix of music and other content. 
Music nowadays consists mostly of pre-recorded and ready-made 
music (i.e., sound recordings produced by record labels and 
intended for mass distribution), but it could also include originally 
produced music, music commissioned exclusively, or live-
performed music. However, in this Article, we use Music to refer to 
music that is within a CMO’s repertoire. Other Content may include news 
 
 43. CRTC Future Programming, supra note 7. 
 44. Audley & Boyer, supra note 33, at 40. 
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and narrated shows (e.g., dramas, documentaries, comedies, and any 
other narrated content), which could be originally produced, 
commissioned exclusively, pre-recorded, or live performed. In this 
Article, however, we use Other Content to refer to any content, including 
music, that is not covered by the CMO’s blanket license. 
While choosing the most attractive content would likely maximize 
revenue, not all content costs the same. For example, originally 
produced or exclusive content may be more attractive (because 
competing stations will not have it), but it may be more costly 
compared to ready-made and widely distributed content. Similarly, 
higher quality content may be more attractive, but it could be more 
costly to produce. Likewise, pre-recorded content may be cheaper to 
broadcast than live content. And finally, content to which there are 
many equally attractive substitutes will be cheaper than content with 
fewer or no substitutes, and so on. Therefore, the choice whether to 
broadcast any content unit will depend on the net marginal revenue 
(NMR) it generates, i.e., the revenue the station expects to generate 
from broadcasting it minus the cost of producing or procuring the 
content (NMR=R-C).45 
Let us first consider what an optimal content mix might look like in 
a competitive market, i.e., when content producers (or those owning 






 45. Id. at 30 (“[A commercial radio station] will want to use a quantity of input (in 
this case, sound recordings) such that the value of the marginal product of this input 
is equal to its price. The value of the marginal product of sound recordings for 
commercial radio corresponds to the additional advertising revenue an operator of a 
music station can obtain from using an additional unit of sound recordings.”). We 
prefer referring to net marginal revenue instead of value of marginal product because 
“marginal product” connotes changes in the quantity of output, but in the case of 
broadcasting, as noted above, differences in productivity prices of content will have 
greater impact on the choice of broadcast content than on the quantity of 
broadcasting. 
 46. By “competitive market,” we do not mean a market without copyright, but a 
market in which copyright owners compete among themselves rather than offer a 
blanket license through a CMO. 
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Figure 1 represents such a market. The horizontal axis represents the 
amount of content broadcast within a time unit, while the vertical axis 
represents the NMR of that content. In a competitive market and 
without any external constraints,47 the radio station is free to choose 
any type of content and will seek to choose a mix that generates the 
highest total product (i.e., highest revenue minus the cost of 
producing or procuring the content). The curve represents such a mix 
of all types of content and shows the diminishing NMR of content. 
NMR is diminishing because the radio station presumably would 
first seek to broadcast content with the widest margin between its 
attractiveness to listeners (and the ad revenue derived from it) and 
the cost of producing or acquiring it. Once the radio station 
broadcasts this content, additional content that generates the same 
ad revenue may be more costly to obtain. Alternatively, that same 
content may cost the same, but may become less attractive and thus 
 
 47. Such as regulations mandating specific quotas for specific types of content. 
Figure 1: Broadcast Time and Net Marginal Revenue of All 
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generate less revenue. At some point, that content may become less 
appealing as well as more costly to obtain. 
 
Figure 2 also represents a competitive content market, except that 
instead of one curve representing all content, it shows two separate 
curves, one for Music and another for Other Content. The point where 
the two curves intersect shows the proportion of time allocated to 
broadcasting Music and Other Content.48 We refer to this point as the 
“optimum mix” point, by which we mean that broadcasting more Music 
beyond that point would be less profitable than broadcasting Other 
Content and the radio station would be better off allocating the 
remaining time to Other Content. Likewise, the radio station would not 
want to increase the time allocated to Other Content beyond that point 
because that would be less profitable than broadcasting Music. In other 
words, the optimum mix point shows the most profitable proportion 
between Music and Other Content. The diagram also shows that many 
 
 48. The proportion we chose for this diagram is arbitrary. It could, in principle, 
be at any other point to the left or to the right, depending on the actual NMR of the 
available works, which could result in the curves sloping at different rates and thus 
intersecting at different locations on the time axis. 
Figure 2: Broadcast Time and Net Marginal Revenue of 
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points on the vertical axis may correspond with two points, one on each 
curve, meaning that at that point the NMR for Music and for Other 
Content is the same (NMRMusicComp=NMROtherContent). At those points, the 
broadcaster is, in principle, indifferent between choosing another unit 
of Music and Other Content: instead of broadcasting another piece of 
Music, the radio station could choose an equally profitable piece of 
Other Content and vice versa. 
Figure 3 demonstrates our central claim. It shows the proportion of 
time allocated to Music and Other Content when Music is being licensed 
under a CMO’s blanket license. With the blanket license, the price of 
every musical composition is zero. This increases the NMR of Music 
under the blanket license (NMRMusicBL) relative to what it would be in a 
competitive licensing environment and relative to the NMR of Other 
Content NMROtherContent. This increase, reflected by an upward shift of the 
Music curve, occurs for the following reasons. 
Recall that NMR=R-C. The mode of licensing does not affect the R, 
only C. Hence, under the blanket license, CMucisBL=0 while the cost of 
content in a competitive environment (either Music or Other Content) 
is greater than zero (CMusicComp>0; COtherContent>0). Therefore: 
Figure 3: Broadcast Time of Music and Other Content with 
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NMRMusicBL=R, while NMRMusicComp=R-CMusicComp and NMROtherContent=R-
 COtherContent 
 
And since R>R-CMusicComp and R>R-COtherContent, it follows that, all things 
equal, 
 
NMRMusicBL>NMRMusicComp and NMRMusicBL>NMROtherContent. 
 
In addition to shifting upwards, the Music curve in Figure 3 is flatter 
compared to the Music curve in Figure 2. This shows that the blanket 
license causes the NMRMusicBL to depreciate at a slower rate compared 
to that of NMROtherContent. This happens because under the blanket 
license, C becomes constant and zero, so the NMRMusicBL will diminish 
in a way that corresponds only to the diminishing rate of MR. By 
contrast, NMROtherContent diminishes more rapidly because it combines 
both the decreasing rate of R and the increasing rate of C. 
Importantly, this upward shift also means that a piece of Other Content 
that otherwise could have been as profitable to broadcast (in terms of 
the net revenue it generates) as a piece of Music becomes less attractive 
once Music is licensed under a blanket license. This further means that 
the blanket license allows Music to crowd out not only Other Content that 
is equally attractive to listeners (and hence generate the same 
advertising revenue), but also more attractive content that could 
generate higher advertising revenue. 
Moreover, while the price paid for playing another song under the 
blanket license is zero, the price paid for the blanket license is fixed 
and remains the same irrespective of the total time devoted to Music. 
Therefore, a broadcaster who chooses to broadcast content not 
covered by the blanket license will have to incur additional costs in 
producing or procuring such content without achieving any 
corresponding savings in the cost of the music available under the 
blanket license.49 Therefore, all things equal, a profit-maximizing 
commercial broadcaster will always prefer to broadcast content 
available under the blanket license (i.e., Music). 
 
 49. This holds true for any content not covered by the CMO’s blanket license, 
whether it is narrated content or music not included in the CMO’s repertoire. 
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If all things were equal, we would expect broadcasters to play only 
Music and no Other Content at all. However, there might be a point 
where broadcasting additional Music from the CMO’s repertoire will 
not yield any additional revenue, while broadcasting Other Content will. 
At that point, which we earlier referred to as the optimum mix point, 
the broadcaster will cease playing Music and opt for playing Other 
Content yielding higher net revenue despite the additional cost. The 
optimum mix point may be reached at the stage where a substantial 
number of listeners is fed-up with listening to pre-recorded music and 
might either tune out from radio or tune into another station that 
offers more varied content. 
Since the optimum mix point also reflects the respective proportions 
of Music and Other Content in the broadcaster’s programming mix, 
Figure 3 also shows how the blanket license affects this proportion: with 
a blanket license for Music, more broadcast time is devoted to Music 
while the time devoted to Other Content decreases. Thus, while the 
blanket license for music causes broadcasters to play more Music, it 
does not result in increased output of broadcast content. Instead, the 
blanket license leads to an increase in the share of broadcast Music, but 
this increase is offset by a corresponding decline in the output of Other 
Content. 
Not only does the blanket license lead to a reduction of the output 
of Other Content, but the blanket license may also alter the kind and 
quality of Other Content produced for radio. One reason is that, as noted 
above, the blanket license allows Music to crowd out equally attractive 
and even more attractive content, lowering the overall quality of the 
broadcaster’s output compared to what it would have been if music 
were procured in a competitive environment and making it less 
attractive than it could be to listeners and advertisers. 
Moreover, the lack of competition between suppliers of Music allows 
the CMO to charge a supra-competitive price for the blanket license. 
This forces the broadcaster to spend a greater share of its revenue on 
Music compared to the total amount spent on music in a competitive 
environment and reduces the amount of money the broadcaster can 
use for producing or acquiring Other Content. 
Furthermore, in countries such as the United States, Canada, and 
the United Kingdom, CMOs charge commercial radio stations a fee 
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based on a percentage of their revenue.50 This can affect the quality of 
programming even further. This mode of pricing discourages the 
broadcaster from improving the quality of its programming by 
spending less on Music and more on quality Other Content. Not only will 
the radio station fail to achieve any cost savings by playing less music, 
but if substituting Other Content for Music indeed improves the quality 
of the programming and results in higher revenue, this will only 
increase the payment owed to the CMO and further reinforce the 
blanket license’s tendency to cause broadcasters to play more Music 
and less Other Content. 
In sum, it appears that the anticompetitive aspects of collective 
administration of copyright and the blanket license are not limited 
simply to higher prices resulting from lack of competition among 
copyright owners. The preceding analysis suggests that, contrary to the 
assertions of commentators such as Landes and Posner,51 the blanket 
license cannot be regarded as an output-increasing procompetitive 
arrangement. While it allows, and indeed encourages, radio stations to 
play more Music, this results only in an increase in the share of Music 
and a corresponding reduction in the share of Other Content. This 
change does not effect a quantitative change in broadcasters’ output, 
but it does affect the quality of this output, causing broadcasters to 
choose inferior programming compared to what they could profitably 
choose if music had been licensed in a competitive environment. 
This effect of CMOs’ blanket licensing poses a challenge not only 
to competition policy but to copyright policy as well. From a 
competition policy perspective, CMOs and their blanket licenses 
reduce competition between copyright owners and increase the 
total price of Music while reducing the supply of equally or even 
more attractive Other Content. These effects are also challenging 
from a copyright policy perspective. While the blanket license for 
Music benefits one group of copyright owners (and by extension, 
one class of creators), this benefit comes at the expense of other 
creators who face suppressed demand for their works and fewer 
market opportunities, as well as at the expense of listeners in the form 
of lower overall quality and diversity of the content available to them. 
 
 50. Einhorn, supra note 13, at 350. 
 51. LANDES & PONSER, supra note 18, at 388. 
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While our analysis demonstrates that blanket licenses drive 
broadcasters to prefer broadcasting more pre-recorded Music and less 
Other Content than they otherwise would in a competitive licensing 
environment, it is worth emphasizing that the crucial distinction is 
between whether content is covered by the blanket license or not. 
Therefore, the blanket license also discourages the broadcasting of 
music that is not part of the CMO’s repertoire, including music that 
could be used royalty-free because it is in the public domain or because 
it is offered under a suitable Creative Commons license. 
The following two incidents, one historical and the other more 
recent, illustrate the issue. The first incident is the ASCAP boycott of 
1941. ASCAP was founded in 1914 but remained fledgling until the 
advent of radio.52 Having secured exclusive rights over most popular 
songs, between 1931 and 1938 ASCAP had raised its fees by 448%.53 In 
1939, the radio broadcasters underwrote the founding of a competing 
CMO, BMI.54 Yet, since ASCAP was the only source for the most 
popular content, BMI was not perceived as posing a credible threat to 
ASCAP’s dominance.55 ASCAP insisted on raising its fees to 7.5% of the 
networks’ gross revenue,56 but this time, the broadcasters decided to 
go on strike and refrain from playing ASCAP music.57 For several 
months in 1941, broadcasters did not play any ASCAP songs.58 Instead, 
they began playing music from BMI’s repertoire, which consisted of 
new arrangements for public domain music that BMI licensed for free 
and music that had previously been excluded from ASCAP’s 
repertoire.59 Genres such as jazz, blues, country, folk, and Latin music, 
“which the snobby ASCAP gatekeepers had long shunned; music that 
was distinct from ASCAP’s repertory and [was] not played on the radio 
 
 52. John Schneider, This Boycott Changed American Music, RADIO WORLD (May 4, 
2015), https://www.radioworld.com/columns-and-views/this-boycott-changed-
american-music [https://perma.cc/P2BN-NXNM]. 
 53. Lawrence Lessig, Laws that Choke Creativity, TED, at 5:40 (Mar. 2007), 
https://www.ted.com/talks/lawrence_lessig_laws_that_choke_creativity. 
 54. BMI’s Timeline Through History, BMI https://www.bmi.com/about/history 
[https://perma.cc/AF5R-D6TR]. 
 55. Lessig, supra note 53, at 6:30. 
 56. IVAN L. PITT, DIRECT LICENSING AND THE MUSIC INDUSTRY: HOW TECHNOLOGY, 
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION RESHAPED COPYRIGHT LICENSING 177, 178 (2015). 
 57. Id. at 177–78. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Schneider, supra note 52. 
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networks; and often ignored by the major music publishers as well,” 
finally got radio airtime.60 
The ASCAP boycott and the resulting competitive entry of BMI not 
only resulted in lower fees, but also transformed American culture.61 
According to Ivan Pitt, the boycott and its aftermath 
introduced a wider range of musical compositions by an even 
broader set of indigenous American songwriters, and in the process 
exposed Americans to a richer variety of music, not particularly 
suited for either Broadway or Hollywood movies. Songwriters and 
composers were now able to take economic advantage of a new 
media platform, the radio, as the barriers to entry came tumbling 
down. Music publishers (and their subjective notions of what they 
considered artistic excellence) would no longer determine which 
one or two songs were to become hits. New record labels, like 
Capitol, were formed to cater to this new, eclectic variety of music, 
songwriters and consumers. ASCAP in later years would embrace 
some of these jazz composers, but only after years of pleading their 
cause due to ASCAP’s selectivity, arrogance, racism, and cultural 
snobbery. As these alternative genres—non-ASCAP affiliated music 
outside of Tin Pan Alley music publishers—received more airplay, 
the genres became widely popular with several of the musical 
compositions reaching the number one spot on the charts, further 
weakening ASCAP’s monopoly and increasing BMI’s market share. 
Long after ASCAP’s disastrous boycott ended, these musical genres 
would endure.62 
But if non-ASCAP music proved highly popular, why did radio 
stations not begin experimenting with such music earlier? Possibly, 
some of the tastemakers in radio might have shared the same 
arrogance, racism, and cultural snobbery as ASCAP did. However, we 
could expect that competition between radio stations and their 
inability to compete on price to attract listeners (as listeners could 
receive broadcasts for free) would drive broadcasters to pursue 
competitive advantage by seeking the most attractive content, thus 
providing strong incentive to experiment with new musical genres.  
And since ASCAP’s blanket license made all the mainstream popular 
content equally available to all radio stations, innovation, in the form 
 
 60. Id.; Pitt, supra note 57, at 178. 
 61. Pitt, supra note 56, at 178–79. 
 62. Id. 
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of experimenting with new genres, should have pushed broadcasters 
to seek that non-ASCAP music much earlier. But that did not happen, 
and our core argument explains why. Broadcasting non-ASCAP music 
would require the radio station to pay additional license fees for that 
content without lowering the fees it paid ASCAP. And with ASCAP’s 
revenue-based fees, even if broadcasting non-ASCAP music resulted in 
higher revenue, part of that additional revenue would be paid to 
ASCAP. So long as the radio station was paying license fees to ASCAP, 
ASCAP’s blanket license created a very strong incentive to refrain from 
using non-ASCAP music, and it took an extreme event like the boycott 
to break away from this dynamic. 
The second example is more recent. In 2010, the producers of Spark, 
a popular radio show of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 
(CBC), revealed that CBC forbade programs from using Creative 
Commons licensed music in CBC podcasts.63 Spark explores “the 
intersection of technology and culture” and previously used Creative 
Commons licensed music because its producers believed this reflected 
and embraced the values of online culture.64 The Director of 
Programming for CBC Radio explained that Creative Commons 
licensed music was banned because some Creative Commons licenses 
carry restrictions on commercial use and so 
[i]n order to ensure that we continue to be in line with current 
Canadian copyright laws, and given the lack of a wide range of music 
that has a Creative Commons license allowing for commercial use, 
we made a decision to use music from our production library in our podcasts 
as this music has the proper usage rights attached.65 
 
 63. Michael Geist, CBC Bans Use of Creative Commons Music on Podcasts, MICHAEL 
GEIST BLOG (Oct. 8, 2010), https://www.michaelgeist.ca/2010/10/cbc-cc-ban 
[https://perma.cc/3V9E-RZ6U]; Matthew Lasar, Why the CBC Banned Creative Commons 
Music from Its Shows, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 12, 2010, 7:00 AM), https://arstechnica.com/
media/news/2010/10/cbc-radio-fans-crabby-over-creative-commons-snub.ars [https:/
/perma.cc/42Q5-LAYX]. 
 64. Cameron, FMA Guest Curator: Spark, CREATIVE COMMONS (Apr. 21, 2010), 
https://creativecommons.org/2010/04/21/fma-guest-curator-spark [https://
perma.cc/MY6F-DWS7]. 
 65. Mike, On CBC Podcasts and CC-licensed Music Available for Commercial Use, 
CREATIVE COMMONS (Oct. 10, 2010) (emphasis added), https://creativecom
mons.org/2010/10/10/on-cbc-podcasts-and-cc-licensed-music-available-for-
commercial-use [https://perma.cc/CM5P-W5S5]. 
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Although the CBC could have allowed the use of Creative Commons 
licensed music that was available for commercial use, they 
implemented a complete ban on all Creative Commons licensed music 
and allowed using only blanket-licensed music.66 Regrettable as that 
decision has been (for the authors, the producers, and listeners) it is 
somewhat understandable from the CBC’s organizational point of 
view. While Creative Commons music may be used royalty free, using 
it is not entirely cost free because it would still require the CBC to 
figure out whether the chosen song comes with a Creative Commons 
license that permits commercial use.67 CBC concluded that incurring 
such administrative costs was not worth its while, given that CMO-
licensed music provides a hassle-free alternative that entails no 
additional cost.68 This is the kind of distortion in cultural production 
that we discuss here: the blanket license led to the exclusion of Creative 
Commons music from the pool of creative material used to produce a 
show. The producers of Spark could not use the music they considered 
most suitable, despite being licensed free of charge, and the artists who 
wrote and performed that music were denied the benefit of being 
broadcast in a popular show by a national broadcaster.69 
These incidents demonstrate the exclusionary harm that the blanket 
license imposes on lesser-known artists. Justice Stevens discussed such 
 
 66. Geist, supra note 63. 
 67. See Lasar, supra note 63 (explaining that determining whether the Creative 
Commons license permits commercial use would be necessary to continue using 
Creative Commons music). 
 68. See id. (noting that the switch to CMO music eliminates the hassle of 
determining proper usage rights). 
 69. A similar problem exists with regard to orphan works. Due to uncertainties 
regarding copyright, broadcasters refrain from using them. Thus, yet again, another 
body of musical works does not get any exposure in the radio, affecting cultural 
production. See Robert Kirk Walker, Negotiating the Unknown: A Compulsory Licensing 
Solution to the Orphan Works Problem, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 983, 986–87 (2014) (suggesting 
that a compulsory license for orphan works would help minimize costs for users, thus 
incentivizing investment in them). For other solutions to the orphan works problem, 
see Ariel Katz, The Orphans, the Market, and the Copyright Dogma: A Modest Solution for a 
Grand Problem, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1285, 1286–87 (2012); Eden Sarid & Omri Ben-
Zvi, A Theoretical Analysis of Orphan Works, 40 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. (forthcoming 
2022) (on file with the authors). 
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harm in his dissenting opinion in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia 
Broadcasting System, Inc.,70 where he noted the following: 
Because the cost to the user is unaffected by the amount used on any 
program or on all programs, the user has no incentive to economize 
by, for example, substituting what would otherwise be less expensive 
songs for established favorites or by reducing the quantity of music 
used on a program. The blanket license thereby tends to encourage 
the use of more music, and also of a larger share of what is really 
more valuable music, than would be expected in a competitive 
system characterized by separate licenses. And since revenues are 
passed on to composers on a basis reflecting the character and 
frequency of the use of their music, the tendency is to increase the 
rewards of the established composers at the expense of those less 
well known. Perhaps the prospect is in any event unlikely, but the 
blanket license does not present a new songwriter with any 
opportunity to try to break into the market by offering his product 
for sale at an unusually low price.71 
Interestingly, the initial criminal complaint that the U.S. 
Department of Justice filed against ASCAP in 1934 identified two types 
of competitive harms:72 
First, “all competition among members of [the] . . . Society in the 
sole rights to perform publicly their respective musical 
compositions, which, but for the illegal combination and 
conspiracy . . . , would have existed, has been eliminated by said 
illegal combination and conspiracy;” second,”[b]y the means 
described the  . . . Society [has] destroyed the incentive of 
broadcasting stations to use the musical compositions of 
composers . . . who are not members of the . . . Society and have 
prevented non-members of defendant Society from receiving the 
compensation for the rights of public performance of their musical 
compositions, which they would otherwise receive, and have limited 
and restricted the popular demand of the listening public to musical 
compositions controlled by defendant Society.”73 
 
 70. 441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
 71. Id. at 32–33 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 72. United States v. ASCAP, Equity No. 78-388 (S.D.N.Y., filed Aug. 30, 1934). 
 73. Marcus Cohn, Music, Radio Broadcasters and the Sherman Act, 29 GEO. L.J. 407, 
424–25 (1941). After the case started, “the Government was granted a mid-trial 
continuance and never returned to the courtroom.” Broad. Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 10. 
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Adding insult to injury, CMOs have claimed, at times successfully, 
that the increased share of music in commercial radio stations’ 
programming justifies the payment of higher license fees. Since 1959, 
the license fees payable by Canadian commercial radio stations have 
increased from 2.75% of stations’ advertising revenue to 3.2% in 1978 
to 4.4% since 2005.74 The Copyright Board has repeatedly relied on 
the increased proportion of music from the stations’ programming as 
one of the main reasons justifying the increase.75 Thus, the blanket 
license has generated a cycle that is virtuous for the CMOs and vicious 
for radio stations and creators of Other Content. The blanket license 
drives radio stations to increase the share of Music in their 
programming while reducing the share of Other Content, not because 
 
Instead, it brought civil actions against ASCAP and BMI in 1940, which resulted in the 
first set of consent decrees. Id. at 10–11. 
 74. Until 1951, radio stations paid a fixed amount based on the number of 
registered radios in any broadcasting area (apportioned between the stations 
operating in that area). Beginning in 1952, the Copyright Appeal Board approved for 
the first time a fee calculated as a percentage of commercial radio stations’ advertising 
revenue. The fee was initially set at 1.75% for CAPAC, while BMI Canada continued to 
collect a per-set fee. In 1959, BMI moved to a percentage-based fee and the combined 
fee for both CMO was set at 2.75%. During the 1960s and early 1970s, the fees were 
mostly determined through negotiated settlements, reaching 3% in 1973. In 1978, the 
Board increased the combined rate to 3.2% in order to “adequately reflect what the 
Board considers to have been the growth in the intrinsic value of music to the 
Industry.” See Final Report to the Minister of Consumer & Corporate Affairs for 1987, 
Re 1987 CarswellNat 1524, 15 C.P.R. (3d) 129 (1987) (not reported). The history of 
these tariffs is described in Public Performance of Musical Works 2003–2007 & Public 
Performance of Sound Recordings 2003–2007, Re, 2005 CarswellNat 3359, 2005 
CarswellNat 3360, [2004] C.B.D. No. 5, 44 C.P.R. (4th) 40, rev’d in part, Re Public 
Performance of Musical Works 2003–2007 & Public Performance of Sound Recordings 
2003–2007,2006 CAF 337, 2006 FCA 337, 2006 CarswellNat 3298, 2006 CarswellNat 
5095, [2006] F.C.J. No. 1547, 152 A.C.W.S. (3d) 415, 354 N.R. 310, 54 C.P.R. (4th) 15, 
reconsidered in Re Public Performance of Musical Works 2003–2007, 2008 CarswellNat 
403, 2008 CarswellNat 404, 64 C.P.R. (4th) 77. The current rate of 4.4% applies to 
revenue above $1.25 million. The rate for the first $1.25 million is 3.2%. Recent tariffs 
also include a reduced rate for low-use radio stations, defined as those who broadcast 
music for less than 20% of their total broadcast time. See, e.g., Statement of Royalties to Be 
Collected by SOCAN, Re:Sound, CSI, Connect/SOPROQ and Artisti in Respect of Commercial 
Radio Stations, C. GAZ. (Apr. 23, 2016), https://decisions.cb-cda.gc.ca/cb-cda/
certified-homologues/en/item/366460/index.do. 
 75. See Public Performance of Musical Works 2003–2007 & Public Performance of 
Sound Recordings 2003–2007, Re, 2005 CarswellNat 3359; COPYRIGHT BD. CANADA., 
ANNUAL REPORT 2005–2006 15 (2006). 
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Music is intrinsically more valuable but because it has become relatively 
more valuable under the current licensing structure. Without the 
ability to save costs by substituting Other Content for Music, radio stations 
spend more money on Music, leaving less money for producing or 
procuring attractive Other Content. This pushes radio broadcasters to 
further rely on Music, which in turn leads CMOs to claim that they 
deserve higher fees. 
In sum, our analysis of the economics of blanket licenses in 
broadcast of musical works reveals two major harms that are the result 
of this copyright licensing scheme. The primary problem pertains to 
the distortion of creative production in radio broadcast. Blanket 
licenses benefit songwriters whose works are part of the CMOs 
repertoire and harm creators of other kinds of content. The blanket 
license scheme favors those songwriters by increasing the use of their 
product but is detrimental to creators of narrated content and non-
CMO managed music, such as Creative Commons licensed music, 
because it incentivizes the use of other’s content. Similarly, it creates a 
preference for blanket-licensed music versus public domain music and 
a possible “double dipping” practice wherein the inflated use of 
blanket licensed music results in CMOs demanding higher 
proportions of broadcasters’ revenue. This analysis may also help in 
explaining the substantial historical changes in radio broadcast in the 
1950s, to which we now turn. 
II.    BLANKET LICENSES AND HISTORICAL CHANGES IN RADIO 
BROADCASTING 
Since its debut in the 1920s, radio has been an influential medium. 
Radio’s impact on culture, political affairs, and entertainment cannot 
be overstated.76 However, in the 1950s the radio broadcast industry 
experienced substantial changes: a shift from narrated content to 
music as the dominant type of content; a change in narrated content 
itself from sophisticated scripted programs to mainly ad-libbed talk-
shows; transformation from in-house production to pre-recorded 
materials; and a rise in the number and proportion of stations 
dedicated to specific music genres. While the literature often explains 
 
 76. See Queen, supra note 2 (“And everything I had to know I heard it on my 
radio.”). 
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these changes as a product of technological advances, social 
transformations, and changes in regulatory requirements, we suggest 
that recognizing the impact of blanket licensing of music not only 
offers an additional explanation for the transformation of radio, but 
also accounts for the particular changes that have taken place in radio 
broadcasting. 
A.   The Golden Age of Radio 
1920 marked the debut of organized radio broadcast in the United 
States, Canada, and the United Kingdom.77 Within a few years, the 
“radio craze” captured the public’s attention; as radio gained 
significant commercial presence, radio sets could be found in almost 
every household, and the number of stations grew exponentially.78 The 
1920s marked the dawn of radio’s “golden age”—a term used to 
describe radio’s prominence in the fabric of daily life and its centrality 
in popular culture, entertainment, and politics.79 Radio’s golden age 
lasted until the late 1950s, which denotes a decline in radio’s 
prominence, as well as substantial changes in programming and a drop 
in listenership.80 
Throughout the golden age, radio programming was similar to 
contemporary broadcast television programming. It relied on a block 
programming strategy to attract listeners.81 Narrated content consisted 
 
 77. RAY BARFIELD, LISTENING TO RADIO, 1920–1950, at 3 (1996); Gary McIntyre, The 
Performance Rights Act: Radio Broadcasting Faces Major Challenge in Long Battle Against 
Music Licensing, 17 J. RADIO & AUDIO MEDIA 135, 138 (2010); GEORGE H. DOUGLAS, THE 
EARLY DAYS OF RADIO BROADCASTING 1 (1987). 
 78. Early Commercial Radio Broadcasting in Canada, 1918–1932, PARKS CAN., https://
www.pc.gc.ca/en/culture/clmhc-hsmbc/res/information-backgrounder/diffusion-
radio-broadcasting [https://perma.cc/2MGS-LN4S] (last modified July 23, 2020); 
ALFRED BALK, THE RISE OF RADIO, FROM MARCONI THROUGH THE GOLDEN AGE 41 (2006); 
see also BRIAN REGAL, RADIO: THE LIFE STORY OF A TECHNOLOGY 76 (2005) (explaining 
that outside the United States, other countries were experiencing similar growth). 
 79. See The Golden Age of Radio, SPARK MUSEUM ELEC. OF INVENTION, https://
www.sparkmuseum.org/the-golden-age-of-radio [https://perma.cc/J25V-7ZM6]. 
 80. JIM COX, RADIO AFTER THE GOLDEN AGE: THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN 
BROADCASTING SINCE 1960 4 (2013); BALK, supra note 78, at 275; NORMAN H. 
FINKELSTEIN, SOUNDS IN THE AIR: THE GOLDEN AGE OF RADIO 113 (1993). 
 81. See MICHAEL C. KEITH, THE RADIO STATION: BROADCAST, SATELLITE & INTERNET 
16, 92 (7th ed. 2007) (explaining that block programming is the arrangement of radio 
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mainly of scripted programs typically accompanied by background 
music and sound effects.82 Each show had a regularly scheduled 
timeslot.83 Network radio stations used to broadcast a mix of original 
content including soap operas, musical shows, comic shows, variety 
programs, quizzes, crime dramas, news reports, and investigative radio 
journalism in a set weekly schedule.84 Many shows became extremely 
popular and people followed their favorite shows avidly.85 The 
content—from the opening theme, via the scripted content and the 
accompanying sound effects, up until the closing sequel—was 
routinely produced in house and, with few exceptions, was broadcast 
live.86 Narrated content amounted to about half the overall broadcast 
time, with music occupying the other half, mainly outside of prime 
time.87 
Broadcasters preferred live broadcasting (of narrated content and 
music alike) for several reasons: first, live shows were considered the 
 
programs so that similar types of programs are grouped together and aired in 
succession). 
 82. See id. at 282–83. 
 83. Steve S. Lee, Predicting Cultural Output Diversity in the Radio Industry, 1989–2002, 
32 POETICS 325, 326 (2004). 
 84. COX, supra note 80, at 16–20; Lee, supra note 83, at 326. 
 85. COX, supra note 80, at 16–17; see also Fredrik Stiernstedt, The Political Economy 
of the Radio Personality, 21 J. RADIO & AUDIO MEDIA 290, 292 (2014) (noting that similar 
to nowadays television, radio personalities had the ability to attract crowds, and that 
the success of a show often rested on the shoulders of the dignitaries that narrated the 
shows. Radio attracted some of the era’s most notable talents—performers, comedians, 
and hosts). 
 86. See KEITH, supra note 81, at 306. 
 87. See COX, supra note 80, at 20; see also BALK, supra note 78, at 245 (mentioning 
that in prime-time hours about 20% of the content being broadcast was music and 
about 80% was narrated). Figures for 1938 and for 1941 show that about half of all 
broadcasting time was devoted to music programs. John Gray Peatman, Radio and 
Popular Music, in RADIO RESEARCH 1942–1943, at 335, 336 (Frank N. Stanton & Paul F. 
Lazarsfeld eds., 1944). A 1946 survey of commercial broadcasters in the continental 
United States provides that a total of 41% of broadcast time was dedicated to music 
programs. See Kenneth Baker, An Analysis of Radio’s Programming, COMMUNICATIONS 
RESEARCH 1948–1949 59 (Paul F. Lazarsfeld & Frank N. Stanton eds., 1st ed. 1949). It 
is interesting to note that, according to Baker’s survey, smaller stations dedicated 48% 
of broadcast time to music programs whereas in large stations this figure drops to just 
33%. Id. 
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“real thing” and more authentic than pre-recorded shows.88 
Furthermore, broadcasters believed that if the performing artists knew 
that they were being recorded and additional ‘takes’ were perhaps 
possible, then they would not necessarily give their best performance 
right from the start (implicating, of course, the need to spend 
additional resources on recording).89 Second, up until the mid-1950s 
records delivered inferior sound quality relative to live broadcast.90 
Third, the length of the records themselves was very limited—up to 
four minutes until the late 1940s, and just under fifteen minutes until 
the late 1950s.91 While this limitation may be less severe for many 
popular songs, for programming that involved longer segments it 
meant that broadcasting recorded content was a cumbersome 
operation that hindered the ability to broadcast smoothly. 
Consequently, national networks prohibited airing recorded 
materials.92 Moreover, until the 1940s, federal regulations required 
that broadcasters notify listeners that the pre-recorded music they were 
about to hear was not live.93 Another notable factor was strong 
opposition from record companies and musicians to the broadcasting 
 
 88. See HUGH CHIGNELL, KEY CONCEPTS IN RADIO STUDIES 46 (2009); Christopher 
Rasmussen, Lonely Sounds: Popular Recorded Music and American Society, 1949–
1979, at 24 (May 2008) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Nebraska-Lincoln), https://
digitalcommons.unl.edu/dissertations/AAI3297654 (noting that as a result of “anti-
record bias,” the Federal Communications Commission passed regulations forcing 
stations to disclose whether the music was pre-recorded or live to deter dishonesty or 
fraud); Stephen D. Perry, The Demise of Live Radio Entertainment in the Heartland: A Case 
Study, 20 J. RADIO & AUDIO MEDIA 134, 134 (2013) (commenting Commerce Secretary 
Herbert Hoover almost made live performances a requirement to operate a radio 
station during the 1920s); ASA BRIGGS, THE BBC: THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS 121 (1985) 
(discussing the preference of live performance to ensure performers did not give 
mediocre performances). 
 89. BRIGGS, supra note 89, at 121. Chignell notes that while in the golden age of 
radio almost all radio was broadcast live, currently most of what we hear is pre-
recorded. However, he maintains, live broadcast is still a defining feature of radio. 
CHIGNELL, supra note 89, at 11, 87–89. 
 90. Perry, supra note 88, at 135. 
 91. See infra discussion in Section II.C. 
 92. However, some small local stations did use records. Rasmussen, supra note 88, 
at 24 n.24. The American Federation of Musicians even banned recording altogether. 
Perry, supra note 88, at 135. 
 93. Rasmussen, supra note 88, at 24. 
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of recorded music.94 Across the industry, less than 9% of broadcast 
content was pre-recorded: of every 128 broadcast hours per week, 
merely eleven included pre-recorded sound.95 
Almost all radio stations also had their own orchestra (or 
orchestras), a house band, or at least some smaller ensemble of 
musicians.96 The musicians were in charge of accompanying the 
narrated content with music—from the theme music to sound effects.97 
But that was not the musicians’ only or even necessarily main pursuit; 
they also delivered full-length musical productions including popular, 
classical, and even jazz music.98 Most stations played a mix of different 
types of music, and very few “specialized” stations, namely stations 
dedicated to a particular type of music, existed.99 This is not to suggest 
that records were never played on the radio. Pre-recorded music 
preceded radio, and broadcasters occasionally used pre-recorded 
music.100 However, broadcast music during the golden age was 
predominantly live.101 
As listenership grew, so did the quest for radio talent. Radio 
personalities (narrators, presenters, etc.) were of “utmost importance 
to programming.”102 Radio personalities often became celebrities and 
 
 94. Id. at 24–25. 
 95. Id. at 24. 
 96. See COX, supra note 80, at 15 (noting that the house bands contributed 
significantly to radio programming at major stations during this era); see, e.g., BALK, 
supra note 78, at 210, 212, 214, 216. 
 97. COX, supra note 80, at 15. 
 98. See id.; James P. Kraft, Musicians in Hollywood: Work and Technological Change in 
Entertainment Industries, 1926–1940, 35 TECH. & CULTURE 289, 305–06 (1994). In 
addition, the house bands were responsible for live advertising jingle melodies. COX, 
supra note 80, at 15. Even today, some of the bigger broadcasters (usually public 
broadcasters) have their own orchestras. Id. Famous examples include the BBC 
Orchestras, the Vienna Radio Symphony Orchestra, MDR Leipzig Radio Symphony 
Orchestra. Id. 
 99. COX, supra note 80, at 4. 
 100. See Rasmussen, supra note 88, at 23–24 (discussing how the recorded music 
industry felt threatened by the impact of radio, in fear it would become obsolete, and 
as a result, perpetuated resistance to playing pre-recorded music; “[a]cross the 
industry, for every 128 broadcast hours every week, only [eleven] [stations and 
networks] featured prerecorded sound”). 
 101. In fact, as mentioned, some stations prohibited the use of records due to their 
inferior quality. Id. at 24. 
 102. Stiernstedt, supra note 85, at 290. 
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enjoyed high regard and decent incomes.103 Broadcasters employed 
radio personalities to attract listenership, increase audience 
predictability, and improve risk management.104 At the same time, with 
some exceptions, singers did not enjoy the same celebrity status that 
they would acquire in later years.105 While there were famous singers, 
songs were generally not linked to a particular performer and it was 
common for several versions of the same song to be produced by 
different record labels.106 
In its golden age, radio was at the core of cultural life. Cultural 
production in radio broadcast in that era was very different from what 
we know today. Radio broadcasters produced a variety of narrated 
content and music, which was often live and produced in house.107 
Radio was, as Norman Finkelstein describes, “a magical link to an 
enchanted world of entertainment, news and culture. By the mid-
1930s, the radio was the most important item in the home. It provided 
shared experiences to everyone . . . [and] created an image of ideal 
America.”108 
B.   Post Golden Age 
In the 1950s, currents began to shift rapidly due to the rise of 
television as a broadcast medium, societal transformations, 
technological advancements, and changes in broadcast regulation. 
By the 1960s, radio’s golden age was over and cultural production 
in radio broadcast significantly changed. Four changes are of 
particular note. First, music dethroned narrated show’s dominance 
and became the primary content. Second, narrated content itself 
changed, with ad-libbed talk shows eclipsing scripted programs. Third, 
instead of relying on in-house production and live materials, greater 
emphasis was placed on broadcasting pre-recorded materials 
produced for wider consumption. Fourth, all-around stations gave way 
to the rise of genre-specific music radio stations (that is, stations 
 
 103. Id. at 291. 
 104. Id. at 292. 
 105. See ELIJAH WALD, HOW THE BEATLES DESTROYED ROCK ‘N’ ROLL: AN ALTERNATIVE 
HISTORY OF AMERICAN POPULAR MUSIC 17 (2009) (describing the replacement of 
amateurism with professional singers with whom celebrity was associated). 
 106. See infra discussion in Section II.C. 
 107. Stiernstedt, supra note 85, at 293. 
 108. FINKELSTEIN, supra note 80, at 117. 
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dedicated solely, or mainly, to one specific genre such as jazz, gospel 
music, Americana, etc.). We now turn to briefly describe each of these 
changes. 
A fundamental change in the post golden age era was the shift in 
dominance of music broadcast vis-à-vis narrated shows. In the golden 
age, most of the prime-time content was narrated shows,109 and while 
music was undeniably prominent in radio broadcast during the golden 
age, in the post golden age years its prominence surged.110 Music 
arguably became the defining feature of post golden age radio. 
Currently, music shows make up the vast majority of radio 
programming.111 
While music broadcasting indeed increased at the expense of 
narrated shows, much narrated content was, and still is, being 
broadcasted. Yet narrated content itself has also changed significantly 
in the aftermath of radio’s golden age. This change was manifested 
both in the kind of narrated content and in the way it was expressed. The 
kind of narrated content changed from scripted programs to ad-libbed 
talk shows.112 This meant that the limit of acceptable language was 
constantly being pushed.113 Respectable narrators, once broadcasters’ 
most treasured asset, were widely replaced by talk-radio hosts 
expressing themselves in a deliberately offensive, inept, or provocative 
manner.114 
Another essential change was a notable decrease in live broadcasting 
and in-house production, and a shift to pre-recorded programs often 
 
 109. In prime-time hours, about 20% of the content being broadcast was music and 
about 80% was narrated. BALK, supra note 78, at 245. 
 110. See CHIGNELL, supra note 88, at 28; BRUCE LENTHALL, RADIO’S AMERICA: THE 
GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE RISE OF MODERN MASS CULTURE 61 (2007). 
 111. Jarl Ahlkvist & Robert Faulkner, Will This Record Work for Us?”: Managing Music 
Formats in Commercial Radio, 25 QUALITATIVE SOCIO. 189, 192–93 (2002); CHIGNELL, 
supra note 88, at 33. 
 112. See CHRISTOPHER H. STERLING & MICHAEL C. KEITH, SOUNDS OF CHANGE: A 
HISTORY OF FM BROADCASTING IN AMERICA 190 (2008) (describing the rise in talk radio 
across AM, FM, and satellite platforms). 
 113. Id. at 192. 
 114. Id. at 168, 235. A notable exception to this phenomenon is public radio, which 
during and after the golden age continued to provide highly regarded narrated 
content. See infra Part III; see also Michael McCauley, Leveraging the NPR Brand: Serving 
the Public While Boosting the Bottom Line, 9 J. RADIO STUD. 65, 67 (2002). 
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produced by centralized radio corporations.115 As mentioned, in the 
golden age, less than 9% of broadcast content was pre-recorded.116 In 
the post-golden age era, almost all the content is pre-recorded, and 
very rarely do broadcasters employ their own orchestra or a house 
band.117 
An additional change in the radio broadcast industry was a shift from 
stations playing “general” music formats, namely a blend of different 
musical genres, to the proliferation of stations dedicated to narrowly 
targeted formats.118 This trend started in the 1950s, and increasingly 
grew in the following decades.119 Radio stations have become so 
specific that current estimates put the numbers at one hundred 
different music radio formats.120 A station’s format, as some scholars 
have noted, is one of the most fundamental features that define a 
music radio station.121 
The shifts described above demonstrate the remarkable changes to 
cultural production in radio broadcast after radio’s golden age. What 
caused these dramatic changes? That is the question we now turn to 
explore. 
C.   Explanations to the Changes in Radio Broadcasting 
No single account fully explains what led to this remarkable change 
in cultural production in radio broadcasting. Several explanations 
together portray a changing landscape in radio broadcast, with 
substantial technological advances as well as social and cultural shifts 
being the most typically referenced explanations. Technological 
advances include the advent of television, new technologies allowing 
portability and ubiquity of radio, changes in recording technology, and 
the inception of FM radio. Social and cultural shifts include the growth 
 
 115. See KEITH, supra note 81, at 348–49 (7th ed. 2006); COX, supra note 80, at 123. 
 116. See Rasmussen, supra note 88, at 24. 
 117. With exception of some public radio broadcasters. 
 118. GABRIEL ROSSMAN, CLIMBING THE CHARTS: WHAT RADIO AIRPLAY TELLS US ABOUT 
THE DIFFUSION OF INNOVATION 65 (2012) (ebook); Robert L. Hilliard, Format, in RADIO 
BROADCASTING: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOUND MEDIUM 105, 105–07 (Robert L. 
Hilliard 2d ed., 1974). 
 119. ROSSMAN, supra note 118, at 65. 
 120. Current estimates suggest that there are over 100 different radio formats. This 
allows broadcasters to target specific demographics. See COX, supra note 80, at 110, 115. 
 121. ROSSMAN, supra note 118, at 64. 
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of suburban America, the rise of the rock star, and the introduction of 
the Top-40 format. We now turn to describe these changes. 
Video, as the lyrics of the Buggles’s famous song suggest, killed the 
radio star.122 Indeed, TV is often credited with being one of the main 
reasons for the demise of radio’s golden age, and seemingly, rightly so. 
Soon after television was introduced, it replaced radio at the heart of 
American homes, culture, and entertainment.123 Media reports from 
the 1950s demonstrate how impactful television’s introduction was on 
radio broadcast, with headlines such as “TV is hot on radio’s heels.”124 
The impact of television was felt in almost every aspect imaginable, 
including in radio revenues, which declined as advertisers abandoned 
radio in favor of television and personnel retention, as salespersons, 
program producers, and radio talent moved to the new medium en 
masse.125 
The correlation between television’s rise and radio’s decline is 
striking. Television (as a commercial good) made its debut in 1948.126 
By 1951, a fourth of U.S. homes owned television sets, by the mid-
1950s, about half of Americans had a television set, and by 1960, 
televisions could be found in almost 90% of American homes.127 In the 
late 1930s, the average American listened to radio for five hours and 
fourteen minutes a day.128 In 1949, radio witnessed the first slip in 
listenership by an average of nine minutes, followed by thirty-six 
minutes in 1951, and two hours and twenty-five minutes in 1955.129 
Radio advertisement sales sank to $55 million in 1955 from $133 
 
 122. The Buggles, Video Killed The Radio Star, supra note 1. 
 123. Marilyn J. Matelski, Resilient Radio, in RADIO: THE FORGOTTEN MEDIUM 5 
(Edward C. Pease & Everette E. Dennis eds., 1995); Alan Albarran et al., “What 
Happened to our Audience?” Radio and New Technology Uses and Gratifications Among Young 
Adult Users, 14 J. RADIO STUD. 92 (2007). 
 124. Matelski, supra note 123, at 11. 
 125. Id.; COX, supra note 80, at 31–34. 
 126. COX, supra note 80, at 29. 
 127. Id.; BALK, supra note 78, at 279–80. 
 128. Paul F. Peter, The American Listener in 1940, 213 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. 
SCI. 1, 3 (1941). 
 129. COX, supra note 80, at 29; BALK, supra note 78, at 279–80. 
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million in 1948 and the average station’s revenue fell by almost 25% 
between 1947 and 1953.130 
Television was not only an exciting new technology; it also provided 
an experience that was seemingly better suited to many of radio’s 
narrated formats. Formats such as soap operas, crime dramas, comedy 
shows, etc. transformed from a mere audio experience to an audio-
visual one.131 Unlike radio, television did not require high audience 
imagination and concentration to provide effective entertainment.132 
There is little doubt that television is one of the core reasons that led 
to the changes that radio broadcasting experienced in the 1950s. 
Television, however, was not the only new technology that was 
introduced in the 1950s and impacted radio broadcast. Other 
technological advances contributed to the changing landscape as well. 
One notable example concerns the portability and ubiquity of radio. 
In the 1950s, radio finally became portable with the commercial 
production of the transistor radio in 1954 and the introduction of the 
car radio as a standard in most automobiles in the 1950s.133 This, inter 
alia, meant that the environment in which listeners could tune into 
radio changed dramatically.134 Radio was no longer a device confined 
to the family living room, around which all gathered to listen; but 
rather, it was to be found practically anywhere—from one’s bedroom 
all the way to the beach. Radio changed from being a social experience 
to an (also) individual one.135 The change in the location and means 
by which people listened to radio meant that the content had to 
 
 130. Total network radio advertisement sales “plummeted from a high of over $133 
million in 1948, to just under $55 million by 1955.” Rasmussen, supra note 88, at 48. 
The average station revenue fell from $246,000 in 1947 to $194,000 in 1953. Id. 
 131. WALD, supra note 105, at 172. 
 132. It is important to bear in mind, as Andrew Crisell notes, that “the 
distinctiveness of radio is not that it involves the imagination while the other media do 
not, but that it involves it to a different extent.” ANDREW CRISELL, UNDERSTANDING RADIO 
9 (2d ed. 1994). 
 133. Rasmussen, supra note 88, at 44; REGAL, supra note 78, at 52–53; Doug Firby, 
The History of Car Radios, from AM to Apple (Aug. 28, 2020), https://www.
theglobeandmail.com/drive/technology/article-the-history-of-car-radios-from-am-to-
apple [https://perma.cc/5Q2Y-TYF4]. 
 134. MARK KATZ, CAPTURING SOUND: HOW TECHNOLOGY HAS CHANGED MUSIC 21 (rev. 
ed. 2010). 
 135. See Rasmussen, supra note 88, at 44 (describing the impact that portability had 
on individuals’ ability to listen to the radio). 
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change too, so that it could comfortably fit in the new surroundings. 
Arguably, listening to radio in one’s living room when there were 
minimal external distractions and radio was the focus of attention, was 
very different than listening to the radio in one’s car or at the park 
where there were many distractions and the listener’s concentration 
level was low. In addition, this portability (alongside other sociological 
changes, as will be described below) meant that listeners were less 
inclined to commit to a fixed programming schedule.136 
Broadcasters needed to start accommodating this new and growing 
kind of listenership. Narrated radio shows that required greater 
attention from their audiences were seemingly unfit to entertain those 
who listen to radio in the background. Music, thus, was a perfect fit for 
listeners because it did not require high levels of attention nor did it 
require commitment to a fixed broadcast schedule, making it the 
perfect background entertainment.137 Ad-libbed talk radio has similar 
characteristics—it neither requires high levels of attention nor 
commands strict adherence to a fixed schedule. 
Alongside these changes in radio technology, the music industry saw 
substantial changes in recording technology, record quality, and 
consumption patterns. New recording technologies (audiotape and 
vinyl) meant considerable improvements in sound quality and 
capabilities.138 In addition, the playing time of records increased from 
four minutes playing time per side to approximately fifteen minutes 
playing time for each side of a record.139 The advancements in sound 
recording technology and the advent of microwave transmission 
contributed to the decline of locally produced live broadcasts and 
reliance on pre-recorded shows, as well as central programming, 
 
 136. Id. (explaining that invention of the portable pocket radio altered Americans’ 
listening habits); CRISELL, supra note 132, at 14 (discussing how the combination of 
the portability of radio and the imagination of its listeners allowed its listeners to enjoy 
radio while participating in other activities). 
 137. See CRISELL, supra note 132, at 14 (describing how listeners can enjoy the radio 
while multitasking). 
 138. See RADIO CULTURES: THE SOUND MEDIUM IN AMERICAN LIFE 173 (Michael C. 
Keith ed., 2008); Seán Street, Crossing the Ether: Public Service Radio and 
Commercial Competition in Britain with Special Reference to Pre-War Broadcasting 
167 (Feb. 2003) (Ph.D. dissertation, Bournemouth University), http://eprints.
bournemouth.ac.uk/393/1/Street,_Sean_Ph.D._2003.pdf [https://perma.cc/82HV-
2VW9]. 
 139. Rasmussen, supra note 88, at 46. 
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syndication, etc.140 With these technologies, production of shows could 
achieve greater economies of scale. 
Several sociological and cultural trends also drove the remarkable 
transformation radio broadcast witnessed in the 1950s. Notable 
examples include: the growth of the suburbs, the “birth” of the rock 
star, the initiation of the Top-40 format, and changes in social values. 
We briefly touch on each. 
In the latter part of the 1940s, the United States, as well as many 
other countries, experienced a rapid expansion of the suburbs.141 The 
1960s witnessed the first time in which the number of Americans living 
in suburbs was greater than the number of people living in cities.142 For 
radio broadcasters this meant that people spent more time listening to 
radio while commuting.143 Commuters were a “captive audience” 
because they had no entertainment alternatives144: radio was the only 
option so broadcasters needed very little to keep listeners engaged.145 
 
 140. KEITH, supra note 81, at 348. 
 141. JON C. TEAFORD, THE AMERICAN SUBURB: THE BASICS 30–31 (2008); ROBERT A. 
BEAUREGARD, WHEN AMERICA BECAME SUBURBAN xi, 5–6 (2006). 
 142. TEAFORD, supra note 141, at 31; BEAUREGARD, supra note 141, at 42. 
 143. Rasmussen, supra note 88, at 93. 
 144. This, ostensibly, remains true even in current times. According to Nielsen’s 
2018 report (measuring audiences across all media outlets): “One reason radio 
maintains its broad reach is due to high usage occurring away from the home. 
Automobiles are the most significant listening location, as 65% of all non-home radio 
use occurs there. That number increases to 77% on weekends.” NIELSEN, THE NIELSEN 
TOTAL AUDIENCE REPORT: Q3 2018 14 (2019), http://www.nielsen.com/us/
en/insights/report/2019/q3-2018-total-audience-report; see also Duncan Stewart, 
Radio Revenue, Reach and Resilience, in TECH., MEDIA & TELECOMMS. PREDICTIONS 2019 60 
(2018), https://www.deloitte.com/content/dam/insights/us/articles/TMT-
Predictions_2019/DI_TMT-predictions_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2LT-
FQLV] (describing how many people enjoy listening to the radio without an agenda, 
e.g., as background noise). 
 145. Rasmussen, supra note 88, at 93–94. 
Suburbanization built on post-war prosperity and the Interstate Highway Act 
reshaped American cities, and one of the many consequences was that more 
and more Americans spent a good portion of their days in cars. The transistor 
transformed the car radio from expensive luxury into an almost standard 
feature by the 1960s. . . . [B]ut it was not only the adults who were a captive 
audience. By 1961, half of all high school senior boys had their own cars, and 
an even larger number access to, and in fact expected regular use of, the family 
car. 
Id. 
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Music and ad-libbed talk shows were sufficient; the alternative was, 
after all, silence. 
Another important cultural development in the 1950s, which 
seemingly prompted change in radio broadcast’s landscape, was the 
“birth” of the rock star. By the mid-1950s, rock and roll music replaced 
classic pop as the leading music genre.146 This created a change in the 
status and importance of the performer—up until then, by and large, 
the song was far more important than the performer.147 In fact, up until 
the early 1950s it remained standard for all major record labels to 
produce their own version of almost every major hit song.148 Rock and 
roll changed this reality. With the advent of rock and roll, songs started 
being linked to a particular performer, and music stardom became 
commonplace.149 When Elvis Presley, Bill Haley & His Comets, and 
Chuck Berry became celebrities, the audience was interested in 
hearing each artist’s performance of their own song, rather than a rote 
performance of the song itself. The radio broadcasting industry had to 
react to this kind of demand and may have also participated in creating 
it. Thus, records of particular performers became more important, and 
house bands’ renditions of those songs mainly obsolete.150 
 
 146. See PETER FORNATALE & JOSHUA E. MILLS, RADIO IN THE TELEVISION AGE 37 
(1980) (describing how record stores were selling mostly rock and roll records by the 
mid-1950s); Hilliard, supra note 118, at 112 (“In the 1950’s the unfamiliar screaming 
sounds coming from portable radios were those of a new phenomenon, Rock and 
Roll.”). 
 147. We are not suggesting that there were no music stars up until that point. There 
were. However, their importance and prominence were limited compared to stardom 
as we know it since the advent of rock and roll stardom. See WALD, supra note 105, at 
18 (describing how, in modern times, we associate hit songs with their singers). 
 148. Id. at 85, 88. 
 149. Id. at 88. 
 150. There, seemingly, is a chicken and egg issue here: broadcasters might have 
merely responded to changing audience tastes; however, they might have played a role 
in creating them. The rise of superstars is linked to technological changes that make 
it possible to create a large market for the individual product (e.g., one performer). 
See Sherwin Rosen, The Economics of Superstars, 52 AM. SCHOLAR, 449, 459 (1983) 
(“Changes in the technology of communication and control of distribution have 
decreased the cost of cloning of talent in many areas and contributed substantially to 
turning mere stars into superstars.”). Before the improvement in sound recording 
technologies, radio provided superior sound quality relative to records, but radio 
performances were live and the audience limited to that of any particular radio station. 
Therefore, even if a song became a hit, its rendition by a particular performer could 
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The introduction of a new format—“Top-40”—offers another 
explanation to the changes in cultural production in radio in the 
1950s. The Top-40 format made its debut in the second half of the 
1950s.151 The format is simple: a playlist consisting of the forty most 
popular songs.152 The format is based on playing pre-recorded music.153 
It was novel in that it challenged the orthodox view according to which 
music and live performance were considered almost synonymous.154 It 
was also different in that it introduced broadcasters to a “low 
budget/high ratings” format.155 The Top-40 format encouraged 
listeners to experience music as an individual, portable, and on-
demand commodity, thus suppressing the notion of music as a social 
experience and turning it into a mere sonic one.156 This also resulted 
in, and is associated with, the rise of the music star. Unlike their 
parents’ generation, which associated music with live performance, the 
1950s generation saw music as something that could be experienced 
in multiple ways; for them, live performances were a social musical 
event, but music was not synonymous with live performance.157 
D.   Blanket Licenses as an Explanation to the Changes in Cultural 
Production in Radio Broadcast 
The above technological, social, and cultural accounts undeniably 
explain why we witnessed shifts in cultural production in radio 
broadcast. However, they may not fully explain why we witnessed the 
particular changes that occurred. We believe that the confluence of 
social, cultural, and technological changes along with the licensing 
practices affecting music, i.e., CMOs’ blanket licenses, can explain the 
 
not scale. Thus, capitalizing on the popularity of the song required multiple 
performances by different performers. However, when the sound quality of records 
improved, radio stations could start playing a specific (recorded) performance, and 
improved transmission technologies made it possible to broadcast particular 
performances (recorded or live) to much wider audiences. 
 151. Rasmussen, supra note 88, at 65–66. 
 152. Id. at 66. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 53. 
 155. Id. at 52. 
 156. Id. at 53. Indeed, in classic “lemonade stand” terms, there is an economic 
incentive to cluster around a successful format, which could be better than being the 
only station to provide a niche product. 
 157. Id. at 3–4. 
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specific changes that occurred in radio—the increasing reliance on pre-
recorded music, the decline of narrated content, and changes of the 
type of narrated content. We will demonstrate this assertion by 
examining the impact of television, transistors and car radios, and 
music preferences. 
Television was introduced in the late 1940s to early 1950s. 
Competing for audience attention, television challenged the radio 
industry. However, the fact that television provides (audio-visual) 
narrated content does not at all imply that radio could not effectively 
compete with television in providing different or improved types of 
narrated content. Conceivably, television is better suited for 
productions that emphasize visual impact, but radio is perhaps better 
suited for other narrated formats such as storytelling, documentaries, 
and in-depth political discussions.158 In the 1950s, radio broadcasters 
could have adjusted their narrated content to successfully face that of 
television. Moreover, they could have exploited radio’s relative 
advantages over television (e.g., portability, lower production costs) as 
a competitive advantage. However, they primarily reacted by opting for 
pre-recorded music. Suggesting that opting for pre-recorded music was 
radio stations’ only viable strategy for surviving the competitive 
pressure of television seems to us overly deterministic and, as we 
consider below, inconsistent with some contrary evidence. 
First, narrated shows were, and remain, extremely popular. This is 
evidenced, for example, by their continuing popularity in public radio. 
After the 1950s, commercial broadcasters turned to pre-recorded 
music. Public broadcasters also started using more pre-recorded music, 
however, they kept broadcasting substantial amounts of narrated 
shows. To this day, the most popular shows on America’s National 
Public Radio (NPR) are narrated.159 Another current example of the 
 
 158.  For example, with respect to documentaries, Chingell notes that radio can be 
advantageous relative to television because the lack of visual stimulation allows the 
listener to focus on the substance. CHIGNELL, supra note 88, at 22–23, 28. While high 
quality programs indeed necessitate high costs, the cost per listener can still be very 
low, provided that the show is able to attract large audiences. “The trouble is that, 
within the market, there is no incentive to recognize this.” David Hendy, A Political 
Economy of Radio in the Digital Age, 7 J. RADIO STUD. 213, 230 (2000). 
 159. Press Release, NPR, NPR Maintains Highest Ratings Ever (Mar. 28, 2018), 
https://www.npr.org/about-npr/597590072/npr-maintains-highest-ratings-ever 
[https://perma.cc/A79D-K4UP]. 
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popularity and market demand for narrated content is the rise of 
podcasts.160 We further discuss this point in Part III. 
Similarly, the fact that radio receivers became portable does not in 
and of itself explain why commercially produced pre-recorded music 
was preferred over other content such as in-house produced music or 
narrated shows. The mobility of radio sets does not in and of itself 
make radio less suitable for listening to quality narrated content or 
unique musical shows produced by broadcasters.161 It can expand an 
individual’s ability to listen to such content in places other than the 
family living room, and with the arrival of cassette recording, these 
opportunities expanded even further. 
Likewise, the rise of rock and roll stardom and subsequent changes 
in music preferences (namely, the shift from satisfaction with 
nonspecific in-house renditions of a song to preferring performer-
specific versions) conceivably explains why pre-recorded music was 
preferred over in-house produced music, but it does not explain why 
music content was preferred over narrated content.162 Even before the 
rock and roll and Top-40 era, people liked music and listened to it; 
nevertheless, narrated shows were the preferred content.163 There is no 
indication that after the 1950s people suddenly preferred music to 
narrated content. The same technologies that contributed to the rise 
of music superstars and musical hits could have also propelled the 
emergence of narrated content stardom. The explanatory power of 
these changes is limited unless we also consider how CMOs’ blanket 
 
 160. Podcasts Playing A Greater Role in Spoken-Word Audio Consumption, Study Finds, 
INSIDERADIO (Oct. 15, 2020), http://www.insideradio.com/free/podcasts-playing-a-
greater-role-in-spoken-word-audio-consumption-study-finds/article_10caf00c-0eb4-
11eb-9cc9-6b4963fa89d3.html [https://perma.cc/385J-3YJB]. 
 161. See, e.g., Zachary Crockett, Tiny Desk: How NPR’s Intimate Concert Series Earned a 
Cult Following, VOX (Nov. 12, 2016, 9:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/culture/
2016/11/21/13550754/npr-tiny-desk-concert [https://perma.cc/527A-G388]; see also 
Anthony DeCurtis, Live at the BBC, ROLLING STONE (Jan. 25, 1991, 05:00 AM), 
https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-album-reviews/live-at-the-bbc-252205 
[https://perma.cc/W98J-T4HL]. 
 162. Nor does it explain why commercial broadcasters could not harness the rise of 
stardom to their advantage, e.g., by collaborating with popular performing artists to 
produce content that could be broadcast exclusively by stations affiliated with the 
broadcaster’s network. 
 163. See LENTHALL, supra note 110, at 61 (describing how radio’s most popular 
programs tended to be “serials or comedy/variety programs”). 
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licenses changed the relative price of broadcasting pre-recorded music 
and made it cheaper relative to narrated content (or any content 
outside the blanket license). 
Another way to illustrate our point is by conducting the following 
thought experiment: imagine we are in the 1950s witnessing many 
different social, cultural, and technological changes. However, licenses 
for broadcasting music are not available under a CMO’s blanket 
license but rather obtained, like all other content, in a competitive 
market. Broadcasters need to cope with the new realities discussed 
above and continue providing audience-attracting content that will 
maximize their profit. They have two options: they can invest resources 
in creating music or narrated content that attracts listenership (option 
A), or they can negotiate with creators of pre-recorded music or pre-
recorded narrated content to use their materials (option B).164 As we 
discuss earlier, both options require expenditure. The closer the costs 
of options A and B, the greater is the possibility that option A will be 
more profitable and therefore chosen. Blanket licenses, if used for 
music content, widen the gap between these options. And indeed, 
blanket licenses, which widened the gap between pre-recorded music 
and other content created in the 1950s, explains why pre-recorded 
music was preferred. Thus, alongside technological and social 
accounts, it explains why we see more pre-recorded music content. 
In essence, technological, social, and cultural changes illustrate the 
shift in cultural production within radio broadcast. The economics of 
content production and procurement, affected by the licensing 
practices pertaining radio music broadcast, i.e., blanket licenses, add 
an additional layer, suggesting why the particular changes happened. 
As Marilyn Matelski notes: 
[S]tation owners redefined the medium to fit the new pragmatics—
lower budgets, less live talent, [and] smaller audience  . . . . Clearly, 
the most serious threat was economic . . . . [T]he financial landscape 
was not entirely bleak; despite lower station revenues, manufacturers 
and owners still had a vested interest in radio’s solvency . . . . Without 
network programming, most local stations could not afford to 
 
 164. There is the option of using in-house production, but the rock and roll 
stardom phenomenon makes it less viable. Similarly, there is the option of using public 
domain music, but this too is less desirable due to popularity of current music vis-à-vis 
older music (which is often the only music in the public domain). 
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underwire large variety shows or dramas, so they turned instead to 
pre-recorded music with [DJs] as hosts.165 
E.   Why Only in the 1950s? 
Assuming that our hypothesis about the impact of CMOs and their 
blanket licenses is correct, it is necessary to explore another angle: 
when radio broadcasting began and gained popularity in the 1920s, 
blanket licensing by CMOs already existed, yet the “death” of the radio 
star did not occur until several decades later. Therefore, defending our 
hypothesis requires us to explain this delay. To do that, we first 
distinguish between the effect of the blanket license on other musical 
content and then its effect on narrated content. 
As our discussion of the ASCAP boycott in 1941 shows, the ASCAP 
blanket license did effectively crowd out non-ASCAP music, indicating 
that the exclusionary impact of the blanket license on other musical 
content was indeed felt from the very beginning of radio. Initially, 
however, the blanket license affected non-ASCAP musical content 
more than it affected narrated content. Therefore, the question 
remains, why did the blanket license not have the same exclusionary 
effect on narrated content until the 1950s? The explanation lies in a 
combination of several factors, including the limitations of sound 
recording technology, regulatory opposition to the use of sound 
recordings, industry wariness, and consumer preferences at the time, 
and the limitations of broadcasting technology that caused radio 
stations to rely mostly on live and local broadcasts. As we explain below, 
once the impediments to broadcasting recorded content were 
removed, the full impact of blanket licenses took effect. 
Until the late 1950s, music records were relatively unimportant in 
the music industry.166 They were considered faint and scratchy items, 
deemed a “generic” means to carry existing sounds around, and 
described as “brief, fuzzy snapshots of popular music, not the thing 
itself.”167 Music on records sounded too rough and inferior in 
quality.168 Radio broadcasters regarded records as “canned” music.169 
 
 165. Matelski, supra note 123, at 12. 
 166. WALD, supra note 105, at 14. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
2021] WHO KILLED THE RADIO STAR? 155 
 
In fact, broadcasters considered the quality of records at the time so 
poor that until the late 1940s the major national broadcasters in the 
United States banned playing pre-recorded music.170 As a result, pre-
recorded music accounted for less than 9% of all music being played 
on the radio.171 Not until the mid-late 1950s did technological 
improvements upgrade the sound quality of the records so that the use 
of pre-recorded material could be considered a viable option for radio 
broadcasters.172 
Certain U.S. federal regulations provide another reason why pre-
recorded music was seldom used until well into the 1940s, despite the 
prevalence of blanket licenses. The Federal Radio Commission and 
later its successor, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), 
were of the opinion that broadcasting recorded music was not in the 
public interest.173 In 1922, the U.S. Secretary of Commerce, Herbert 
Hoover, sought to limit the use of pre-recorded materials in favor of 
live performances.174 U.S. agency regulations dictated that new stations 
had to accept not to perform pre-recoded music or to subject to 
licensing scrutiny once their initial three-year license expired. 
Moreover, regulations required that broadcasters who played pre-
recorded music notify listeners before each song that the music they 
were about to hear was not live.175 In 1940, the FCC eased the listener 
notification requirement from prior to every song to once every thirty 
minutes, and by the end of World War II, it eliminated this 
 
 170. Rasmussen, supra note 88, at 24. 
 171. See id. 
 172. It is also worth noting the material from which the records were made; shellac 
was not very durable, and often records mailed to the stations were received broken. 
Only with the advent of vinyl in the late 1940s to early 1950s was this problem properly 
solved. The shellac 78 RPM records also had a short life span of 75–125 plays, which 
meant expenses to buy new ones. Id. at 46, 58; ANDRE MILLARD, AMERICA ON RECORD: A 
HISTORY OF RECORDED SOUND 202 (1995). 
 173. Rasmussen, supra note 88, at 24. 
 174. PERRY, supra note 88, at 134. 
 175. DEP’T OF COM., RADIO SERV. BULL. NO. 125, REGULATION GOVERNING THE 
BROADCASTING OF MECHANICAL REPRODUCTIONS, at 9 (1927); DEP’T OF COM., RADIO 
SERV. BULL. NO. 153, GENERAL ORDER NO. 78, CHARACTER OF ALL MECHANICAL 
REPRODUCTION MUST BE ANNOUNCED, at 10–11 (1929) (“All broadcasting stations shall 
announce clearly and distinctly the character of all mechanical reproductions 
broadcast by them, the announcement to immediately precede the broadcasting of 
each record.”); Rasmussen, supra note 88, at 24. 
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requirement completely.176 That is, well into the mid-1940s, federal 
regulations implied that recorded music was poor, sub-standard and 
not the “real thing,” thus reinforcing the perception of recorded music 
as an inferior product.177 
Another important factor was the fierce opposition from musicians 
and record companies, who feared that broadcasting recordings would 
reduce employment opportunities and sales, respectively. From the 
1920s through the 1940s, musicians and record companies took 
various measures to prevent or discourage broadcasting records.178 
These measures included direct agreements with broadcasters, 
recording bans, legislation initiatives, and legal actions based on claims 
of a common law public performance right to prevent unauthorized 
broadcastings of recorded music.179 For example, the American 
 
 176. Rasmussen, supra note 88, at 24. 
 177. Interestingly, record companies themselves also contributed to broadcasters’ 
negative attitude towards pre-recorded music. Believing that radio play will result in 
loss of record sales, record companies in the 1930s stamped their products with “not 
licensed for radio broadcast” Id. at 25. Regulation, not just that of copyright, but also 
of other fields of law and especially antitrust, unsurprisingly, strongly impacts cultural 
production in radio broadcast. For example, in 1996 Congress increased the limits on 
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programming formats. Peter DiCola, FCC Regulation and Increased Ownership 
Concentration in the Radio Industry 17 (Nw. Univ. Sch. of L., Faculty Working Paper No. 
33 2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1553483#. 
 178. See Zvi Rosen, Common-Law Copyright, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 1055, 1093 (2017) 
(reiterating that several lawsuits were filed during this period to actively prevent the 
broadcasting of recording music from competing with live music); see also Robert A. 
Gorman, The Recording Musician and Union Power: A Case Study of the American Federation 
of Musicians, 37 SW. L.J. 697, 701 (1983) (discussing the attempts by unionized 
musicians to picket and protest live recordings as well as organize public relations 
campaigns). 
 179. See ROSEN, supra note 178, at 1086, 1088 (recounting the varied and fervent 
efforts by musicians, producers, and the government to come to an agreement over 
the broadcasting of records); see also Mindy Schwartz, Comment, The American 
Federation of Musicians: An Unearned Encore for Featherbedding, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 1339, 
1342 (2001) (discussing the role of labor unions in the radio industry and their effort 
to continue securing contracts for musicians in the face of technological 
advancement); GORMAN, supra note 178, at 700 (noting the role of the American 
Federation of Musicians and their efforts during the 1920s and ‘30s to prevent record 
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Federation of Musicians, an organization which represented most 
professional musicians in the United States and Canada, “declared 
war” in the mid-1930s on radio and recorded music.180 In the late 
1930s, the Federation reached an agreement with key radio stations to 
significantly increase the size of radio staff orchestras.181 The 
Federation also made an agreement with record companies that the 
latter include a restrictive label on their records, stating that the 
records were restricted only to non-commercial use on phonographs 
at home.182 The intention behind this restriction was to establish an 
equitable servitude in the musical recordings that could allow 
musicians to enjoin their use in radio broadcast.183 
Similarly, the National Association of Performing Artists, which 
formed in 1935 and included some of the principal bandleaders of the 
time, firmly opposed recorded music.184 This Association viewed 
recorded music as a threat to performing artists’ livelihood, or, in the 
words of the Association’s president, Fred Waring: “I felt it unfair . . . 
for [radio broadcasters] to have our records playing in competition to 
us, . . . and it was a growing menace to all performers.”185 Indeed, in 
1935, the Association took things to court, suing Philadelphia radio 
station WDAS for broadcasting a record despite the record including 
the inscription “Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast.”186 The trial court, 
and later the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, held that this inscription 
created an enforceable equitable servitude, and thus a valid ban on 
playing the record on the radio.187 Soon thereafter, in 1942, the new 
 
broadcasting from destroying the labor market for live musicians as a result of 
technological developments in entertainment). 
 180. ROSEN, supra note 178, at 1085–86; SCHWARTZ, supra note 179, at 1343; see also 
GORMAN, supra note 178, at 702–03 (noting that in 1937, an annual convention for the 
American Federation of Musicians mandated their president to take economic 
measures against the encroachment of record broadcasting). 
 181. ROSEN, supra note 178, at 1086. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. ALBIN J. ZAK III, I DON’T SOUND LIKE NOBODY: REMAKING MUSIC IN 1950S 
AMERICA 20 (4th ed. 2010); VIRGINIA WARING, FRED WARING AND THE PENNSYLVANIANS 
138–39 (1997). 
 185. ZAK, supra note 184, at 20; WARING, supra note 184, at 138. 
 186. Waring v. WDAS Broad. Station, Inc., 27 Pa. D. & C. 297 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1936), 
aff’d, 194 A. 631 (Pa. 1937). 
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president of the American Federation of Musicians, James Petrillo, 
declared a nationwide recording ban.188 This ban, as Robert Gorman 
argued, was not targeted against the recording industry, but rather 
against the broadcasting industry.189 The ban resulted in a set of 
agreements signed in 1944 between the Federation and most 
recording companies, according to which the record companies paid 
royalties on each record sold.190 
Another measure taken by the Federation was negotiating quotas of 
orchestra size and expenditure with local radio stations, and the 
mandatory employment of “standby” orchestras.191 These actions 
resulted in direct action from Congress—the passage of the Lea Act192 
in 1946, the Taft-Hartley Act193 in 1947, and a slew of Congressional 
hearings to address issues caused by the Federation in 1948.194 The Lea 
Act, for example, is applicable only to the broadcasting industry and 
outlaws or restricts many means of union pressure or collective 
bargaining that could compel broadcasters to maintain or increase 
their orchestras.195 The Lea Act, as Gorman noted, “represented the 
beginning of the end for staff orchestras, at both the network and local 
levels.”196 And indeed in 1948, the Federation reversed several of its 
policies in the broadcast industry.197 
As the above examples demonstrate, throughout most of the golden 
age, there was strong opposition from regulators, record companies, 
and musicians to broadcasting records on the radio as well as 
uncertainty as to the lawfulness of broadcasting records labeled “Not 
 
 188. GORMAN, supra note 178, at 705. 
 189. Id. 
 190. See id. at 707–08 (detailing the first agreements were signed in September 1943 
but the ban was not lifted until 1944 when the final holdouts signed agreements). 
 191. Id. at 710–11 (explaining the American Federation of Musicians demands to 
hire entire extra orchestras to artificially encourage employment or pay a fee to local 
employers). 
 192. Pub. L. No. 79-344, ch. 138, 60 Stat. 89 (1946). 
 193. Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947). 
 194. See Gorman, supra note 178, at 721 (explaining that congressional hearings in 
addition to other events like the passage of legislation lead the AFM to reverse many 
of their bargaining positions in 1948). 
 195. Note, Lea Act, Taft-Hartley and State Remedies for Featherbedding, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 
754, 755 (1955). 
 196. Gorman, supra note 178, at 715. 
 197. Id. at 721. 
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Licensed for Radio Broadcast”. This reality, it seems, likely delayed the 
use of pre-recorded music. 
Records’ playing time was yet another reason why radio broadcasters 
refrained from using pre-recorded content until the late 1950s. A 
record’s playing time is contingent on the record’s turntable speed 
and groove spacing.198 The record’s playing speed is dictated by its 
rotational speed, which is measured in revolutions per minute 
(RPM).199 Until the late 1950s, the standard record was ten inches in 
diameter and had a seventy-eight RPM speed, meaning that the 
standard record could hold about three minutes.200 Even the bigger 
twelve-inch records could hold no more than five minutes.201 After a 
few short minutes of music play, one would have to flip side or change 
the record.202 This made the operation of playing pre-recorded 
material a cumbersome venture. Broadcasters preferred to avoid this 
burdensome, clumsy, and costly operation, so they refrained from 
using pre-recorded material until the advent of the long-playing record 
technology in the late 1950s.203 Long-playing technology allowed for 
high fidelity and longer recordings.204 
Musical preferences, too, were a reason why broadcasters refrained 
from using pre-recorded music until the 1950s. As mentioned, prior to 
the advent of rock and roll, which gave rise to a new type of stardom, 
less emphasis was placed on whether it was a house band or a record 
being played.205 House bands and orchestras were in most cases, and 
definitely in the case of the bigger broadcasters, on the broadcasters’ 
salary roll and earning fixed salaries (regardless of the amount of 
 
 198. Dyer v. Sound Studios of N.Y., Inc., 85 F.2d 431 (3d Cir. 1936). 
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music played in practice).206 Thus, from the broadcaster’s point of 
view, there was no immediate cost incentive to prefer pre-recorded 
music. In fact, the broadcasters’ house bands could be described as 
providing broadcasters with music at a marginal cost nearing zero, at 
least in the short term: once the musicians are on the station’s payroll, 
the studio is built, and the music is licensed, the marginal cost of 
having the house band play another song is very low. Given audience 
indifference to the particular rendition of the song and that both 
playing a recorded version or having the house bands play it entailed 
a near-zero marginal cost, it came down to which was available to use 
in the moment, not to cost. For the reasons mentioned above, house 
bands were the likely answer. 
But what about the choice between music and narrated content? As 
noted earlier, until the 1950s, technological limitations required 
broadcasters to focus on live productions.207 As a result, whether the 
broadcaster chose to broadcast music or narrated content such as 
drama or comedy, it would have to hire professional musicians and 
actors and pay for their labor. Therefore, even though the blanket 
license created a cost advantage for music relative to narrated content 
(as far as the copyright licensing component of the production is 
concerned), this cost advantage affected only one component of the 
cost of content production. So long as most content was produced in 
house and performed and broadcast live from the studio, the cost 
structure of music and narrated content was very much the same, and 
while the music blanket license’s zero marginal cost for the music gave 
it some cost advantage over narrated content, the impact of this cost 
advantage was not as pronounced as it would become later. 
Improvements in recording technologies and the arrival of long-
range broadcasting changed the calculus. They allowed broadcasters 
to rely on pre-recorded programming and for the full impact of 
blanket licenses to take effect. The marginal cost of broadcasting a pre-
recorded sound recording is nearly zero and hence broadcasting 
sound recordings presents a significant cost advantage relative to 
content produced inhouse. And once the quality of sound recordings 
 
 206. See Kraft, supra note 98, at 305–06; see also Perry, supra note 88, at 134 (stating 
that even the small stations that struggled to find talent went to lengths to secure live 
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 207. See discussion supra notes 133–34, 138–40 and accompanying text. 
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improved, thereby eliminating the sound quality advantage of live 
broadcasts, consumer attitude changed. Additionally, regulatory 
restrictions on broadcasting pre-recorded materials were lifted. Radio 
stations were then able to take advantage of these various changes, 
reduce the share of content produced in house, and increase the share 
of pre-recorded content. 
In principle, these cost advantages also applied to narrated content, 
but narrated content was not part of the CMOs’ blanket licenses. 
Accordingly, the marginal cost of broadcasting narrated content was 
still positive and therefore higher than the marginal cost of playing 
another recorded song from a CMO’s repertoire. If in the days of live, 
in-house produced programming the blanket license affected mostly 
the choice of which music to play and led to the exclusion of non-CMO 
music, the shift to relying on pre-recorded content expanded the reach 
of the blanket license’s exclusionary impact and its capacity to crowd 
out any content. 
The existing technological, social, and cultural explanations along 
with the economic incentives that blanket licensing generates, provide 
a compelling explanation as to why the particular changes in cultural 
production in commercial radio broadcast took place. We now turn to 
examine how this analysis can also explain the differences in patterns 
of cultural production between current commercial and public radio. 
III.    CURRENT TRENDS OF CULTURAL PRODUCTION IN PUBLIC AND 
COMMERCIAL RADIO 
At present, public radio stations typically offer a listening experience 
that is different from commercial radio. For example, public radio 
offers much more narrated content, such as documentaries, in-depth 
discussions of topical issues, and investigative journalism. In this Part, 
we demonstrate that the economics of blanket licensing may explain 
why public and commercial radio typically offer a very different 
product. Essentially, our explanation is this: commercial broadcasters 
are mainly interested in maximizing profits where public broadcasters 
are non-profit organizations whose primary mission is providing a 
public service. The zero marginal cost of playing pre-recorded music 
from the CMO repertoire incentivizes commercial broadcasters to play 
as much of that music as possible. In principle, the marginal cost 
advantage of music under the blanket license should also be appealing 
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to public broadcasters, and they, just like commercial broadcasters, 
should feel a strong push to prefer music available under the blanket 
license over other content.208 However, while public broadcasters are 
not fully immune to the allure of the blanket license, their not-for-
profit mandate allows them to partially resist it in a way that 
commercial broadcasters cannot. 
“Public radio” covers a wide variety of activities by different broadcast 
organizations, providing a public service and typically operating on a 
non-profit basis.209 Public radio’s mission, generally defined, is to serve 
the public by fostering a marketplace of ideas and information.210 
Public radio mandates often include the promotion of cultural 
diversity, or reliance on locally produced content. Some also suggest 
that public radio is a means by which governments wish to correct 
market failures caused by the primary reliance on commercial 
providers.211 
 
 208. See supra Part I (discussing the CBC Spark incident). 
 209. There are several models of public radio funding: direct governmental 
funding, license fees that are tied to radio (or television) sets being purchased (these 
two are the popular funding scheme in Europe), funding by selling advertisements 
(this, along with some governmental funding is the Canadian model), or fundraising 
(as is in the United States). See MICHAEL MCCAULEY, NPR: THE TRIALS AND TRIUMPHS OF 
NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO 4–5 (2005) (explaining that NPR and other public radio 
formats in the United States receive funds from fundraising and the Federal 
Government); ROBERT ARMSTRONG, BROADCASTING POLICY IN CANADA 117–18 (2d ed. 
2016) (explaining the basic purpose and definition of public radio); ALAN B. ALBARRAN 
& GREGORY G. PITTS, THE RADIO BROADCASTING INDUSTRY 134 (2000) (distinguishing 
“public radio” from other stations by purpose and band location). 
 210. See Street, supra note 138, at 10; see also Mission and Vision, NPR, http://
www.npr.org/about-npr/178659563/our-mission-and-vision 
[https://perma.cc/KD53-K9N5] (declaring that “[t]he mission of NPR is to work in 
partnership with Member Stations to create a more informed public—one challenged 
and invigorated by a deeper understanding and appreciation of events, ideas and 
cultures”); Mission, Values and Public Purpose, BBC, https://www.bbc.com/
aboutthebbc/governance/mission [https://perma.cc/K6YM-AHPA] (emphasizing 
the purpose is “to act in the public interest, serving all audiences through the provision 
of impartial, high-quality and distinctive output and services which inform, educate 
and entertain”); Mandate, CANADIAN BROAD. CORP., https://www.cbc.radio-
canada.ca/en/vision/mandate [https://perma.cc/2243-G79W] (announcing the 
vision is to “be predominantly and distinctively Canadian” and to “provide radio and 
television services incorporating a wide range of programming that informs, 
enlightens and entertains”); see Street, supra note 138, at 10. 
 211. ARMSTRONG, supra note 209, at 117. 
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Compared to commercial radio, public radio programming contains 
substantially more narrated content as well as more in-house produced 
content. The narrated content includes more high-investment scripted 
shows (such as documentaries and radio drama) rather than low-
investment ad-libbed talk radio that often characterizes commercial 
radio.212 These patterns are found both in overall airtime and in prime-
time broadcast.213 Many of the popular formats of radio’s golden age 
that are currently rarely found on commercial radio, survived, and are 
even flourishing, on public radio.214 
Approximately 35% of the content broadcast in public radio in the 
United States is narrated,215 whereas in commercial radio narrated 
content amounts to substantially lower figures, likely around 15%.216 
Narrated content in public and in commercial radio also tends to differ 
in its character: narrated content in commercial radio tends to be ad-
libbed talk shows, whereas in public radio there tends to be more in-
depth, high-investment and content-rich programs, such as 
investigative journalism, documentaries, in-depth news analysis, etc.217 
Narrated programs on public radio have been revered for their 
thoroughness of coverage and breadth of subjects in a way that “[n]o 
commercial network comes close to replicating.”218 
 
 212. RON RODRIGUES ET AL., ARBITRON, PUBLIC RADIO TODAY 2013: HOW AMERICA 
LISTENS TO RADIO 6 (2013), [hereinafter PUBLIC RADIO TODAY] http://www.
arbitron.com/downloads/PublicRadioToday2013_ExecutiveSummary.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5MLS-7JKM]. 
 213. Id. at 4–5. 
 214. See RON RODRIGUES ET AL., ARBITRON, RADIO TODAY: 2013 HOW AMERICA LISTENS 
TO RADIO 2, 6 (2013), [hereinafter RADIO TODAY] http://www.arbitron.com/
downloads/Radio_Today_2013_execsum.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JUE-T7QH]. 
 215. Figures are taken from Arbitron’s dual Public Radio Today 2013 How America 
Listens to Radio reports and from the Nielson Total Audience Report. These, to the best 
of our knowledge, represent the latest publicly available figures. Moreover, when it 
comes to actual listenership (“audience share among all Public Radio listening”), the 
numbers are even more striking: narrated content (categorized as 
“News/Talk/Information”) amount to 51.7% of total listenership. See RODRIGUES ET 
AL., PUBLIC RADIO TODAY, supra note 2, at 6. 
 216. See RODRIGUES ET AL., RADIO TODAY, supra note 214, at 6; RODRIGUES ET AL., 
PUBLIC RADIO TODAY, supra note 212; see also Audley & Boyer, supra note 33, at 43–45 
(calculating that during off peak times news accounts for approximately 19% of 
content, while during peak it can be as low as 8%). 
 217. See, e.g., ALBARRAN & PITTS, supra note 209, at 147. 
 218. See KEITH, supra note 81, at 15; see also ALBARRAN & PITTS, supra note 209, at 147. 
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In addition, commercial radio stations’ narrated shows tend to be 
syndicated out-sourced programs, while public radio stations produce 
considerably more in house.219 Moreover, in the United States, even 
when public radio broadcasts syndicate out-sourced programs, 
significant segments are left for local stations to fill with in-house 
content: NPR, for example, intentionally leaves large segments in its 
popular Morning Edition program for local stations’ self-produced 
content.220 Many public radio broadcasters also support their own 
orchestras, and may support and broadcast local concerts and even 
town hall meetings on public affairs.221 
Public radio in the United States enjoys substantial listenership and 
high ratings, with an average of twenty-eight million Americans tuning 
in to NPR weekly, and a constant growth in donations and giving, 
revenue, broadcast reach, and investment in content.222 In 2018, for 
example, NPR enjoyed the highest rating in its history.223 NPR’s 
narrated programs The Morning Edition and All Things Considered enjoy 
a high weekly listenership in the United States, and are the two highest-
ranking narrated programs in the country with over 14.5 million weekly 
 
 219. See Monroe Price & Marc Raboy, Public Service Broadcasting in Transition: A 
Documentary Reader, OTHER PUBL’NS FROM THE CTR. FOR GLOB. COMMC’N STUD. Nov. 
2011, at 23, https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1020&
context=cgcs_publications [https://perma.cc/2WZK-EXNQ]; RALPH ENGELMAN, 
PUBLIC RADIO AND TELEVISION IN AMERICA: A POLITICAL HISTORY 23 (1996) 
(explaining that the need to maximize audiences and advertising revenue drove 
commercial stations toward syndication and the creation of networks). 
 220. About Morning Edition, NPR (Aug. 12, 2009, 2:57 PM), http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyId=5003 [https://perma.cc/EQ6N-S5FM]. 
 221. KEITH, supra note 81, at 15. Moreover, public radio also has an important role 
in cultural participation. Public radio broadcasts certain musical contents that 
otherwise would not reach all publics. Berry and Waldfogel, for example, demonstrate 
that in the absence of public broadcasting, persons living outside the largest markets 
would receive very little classical music or jazz programming. See Steven Berry & Joel 
Waldfogel, Public Radio in the United States: Does it Correct Market Failures or Cannibalize 
Commercial Stations, 71 J. PUB. ECON. 189, 208 (1999). We do acknowledge that some, if 
not most, of this content is possibly pre-recorded (but that is beside the point). 
 222. See Public Broadcasting Fact Sheet, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 29, 2021), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/fact-sheet/public-broadcasting 
[https://perma.cc/U8UW-LP92] (illustrating the consistent growth in revenue and 
content investment over the past three years for the top 123 news casting public radio 
licensees). 
 223. Press Release, NPR, supra note 159. 
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listeners each.224 Similarly, in Canada, CBC Radio One has the highest 
tuning share (15%) of all English-language market formats (while 
adult contemporary is the second most popular format with 11% 
tuning share). In the Canadian French-language market formats, ICI 
Radio-Canada Première has the second highest tuning share (19%) 
(while adult contemporary is the most popular format with 29% tuning 
share).225 
Why is the cultural product produced by public broadcasters 
different from that of commercial broadcasters? One answer rests in 
simple economics. Commercial radio stations are for-profit businesses 
and depend on advertising as their primary revenue source.226 Since 
their profit depends on the difference between their ad revenue and 
the cost of production, they face a strong incentive, as we explain in 
Part II, to play as much music under the blanket license as possible. 
By contrast, public broadcasters do not rely on advertising revenue 
at all or to the same extent.227 Although their funding may depend on 
the size of their audience (e.g., because it may be easier to maintain or 
increase public funding if the size of the audience is large or increasing 
than it is if it is small and decreasing, or it may be easier to get greater 
listener contributions from a larger pool of listeners, etc.), the 
willingness of those funders may also depend on the quality of 
 
 224. Id.; see also ALBARRAN & PITTS, supra note 209, at 147 (applauding the longevity 
and success of both All Things Considered and Morning Edition with radio listeners). 
 225. CRTC Future Programming, supra note 7, at 144–45 (2019). The public 
broadcaster’s dedicated music channels, CBC Radio 2 and ICI Musique, enjoy tuning 
shares of 3% and 5% respectively. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. For example, CBC’s radio programming is funded mostly by the federal 
government and is not permitted carrying advertising except for programs that are 
available to networks only on a sponsored basis. See TV and Radio Advertising Basics, 
CAN. RADIO-TELEVISION & TELECOMM. COMM’N (Nov. 19, 2020), https://crtc.gc.ca/
eng/television/publicit/publicit.htm. NPR stations’ funding comes from several 
sources, including listener contributions, corporate sponsorship, in-kind and direct 
support from universities (for those licensed to a college or university), foundation 
grants and major gifts, grants from the Federally funded Corporation for Public 
Broadcasting, and in some cases, state and local governments. However, NPR itself is 
funded by membership fees paid by its stations plus corporate sponsors. Other sources 
of revenue include institutional grants, individual contributions, and fees paid by users 
of the Public Radio Satellite System. See Public Radio Finances, NPR, https://
www.npr.org/about-npr/178660742/public-radio-finances [https://perma.cc/B5M5-
G778]. 
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programming and whether they consider the content appealing. Also, 
the mandate of public radio may often require it to broadcast the type 
of content that may not necessarily attract the highest number of 
listeners. 
This funding structure attenuates the distorting impact of the 
blanket license on the choice between Music and Other Content. While 
the zero marginal cost of Music implies that playing another song is, 
from a net revenue perspective, preferable to playing other equally 
attractive content, maximizing net revenue is not the public 
broadcaster’s goal. This is not to suggest that public broadcasters do 
not respond to cost-minimizing incentives, nor do we argue that the 
difference in the programming between public and commercial radio 
results solely from how they respond to the blanket license’s incentive 
to maximize the broadcasting of pre-recorded music. Indeed, public 
broadcasters may have both internal incentives (e.g., mission 
orientation) and external ones (e.g., better pitches to donors) to 
differentiate their content from that of commercial broadcasters and 
might have differentiated their content even in a world without blanket 
licenses. However, the incentive that public broadcasters face to 
maximize Music and minimize Other Content is weaker compared to 
commercial broadcasters. Commercial broadcasters face a double 
disincentive to substitute Other Content for Music: first, because such 
substitution will not result in lower license fees for the blanket license, 
and second, because even if such substitution results in higher quality 
programming and hence greater revenue, the CMO will get a cut of 
that increased revenue. By contrast, public broadcasters do not pay a 
revenue-based license fee and therefore are affected only by the first 
disincentive but not the second.228 Not facing this dual disincentive 
allows public broadcasters to air content that might not otherwise find 
a place on airwaves entirely dominated by revenue maximization. 
IV.    POSSIBLE LICENSING MODELS FOR THE BROADCAST OF MUSIC 
The current structure of blanket licensing of copyright musical 
works by CMOs distorts cultural production in radio broadcast. In this 
 
 228. In Canada, for example, CBC pays a fixed-sum monthly license fee. See 
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation Radio Tariff; 154 C. Gaz. 202, 46 (Can.), 
https://decisions.cb-cda.gc.ca/cb-cda/certified-homologues/en/item/488274/
index.do. 
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Part, we inquire whether there might be alternative models that can 
alleviate the negative impacts of blanket licensing, at least in part. First, 
we consider some alternatives to the current model of CMOs providing 
blanket licenses. Second, we challenge the entrenched assumption 
that collective administration and all-you-can-eat blanket licensing 
must go hand in hand. Third, we demonstrate some of the distortion 
caused by the blanket-licensing model can be alleviated even if 
collective licensing by CMOs is maintained. 
Most of the literature on CMOs and their blanket licenses tends to 
focus on a trade-off between lower transaction costs and monopoly 
market power. On the one hand, CMOs offer the convenience and the 
economies of scale in obtaining licenses, collecting license fees, 
monitoring compliance with license terms, and enforcement against 
infringers. On the other hand, collective administration of copyrights 
eliminates price competition between copyright owners, resulting in 
the concentration of market power in the hands of monopolistic 
CMOs and the potential abuse of such power.229 The conventional 
wisdom that underlies the common regulatory approach to collective 
administration of copyright seeks to optimize this trade-off by 
permitting such competition-reducing practice while limiting the 
CMO’s ability to exercise the resulting market power and dictate supra-
competitive prices.230 The CMO’s market power is mitigated by 
imposing on it a duty to grant licenses and charge only “reasonable” or 
“fair and equitable” fees, which ideally, would approximate, as 
Canada’s Copyright Act now states explicitly, “what would have been 
agreed upon between a willing buyer and a willing seller acting in a 
 
 229. Besen et al., supra note 11, at 338 (asserting that the prohibitive costs of 
administrating copyrights on an individual basis means that natural monopolies are 
likely to form); Glynn Lunney, Copyright Collectives and Collecting Societies: The United 
States Experience, in COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS 311–45 
(Daniel J Gervais ed., 2006); Handke & Towse, supra note 21, at 939–40; see, e.g., Katz, 
Rethinking, supra note 11, at 543 (explaining the natural monopoly phenomena and 
the competing perspectives for and against the monopolistic nature of music). 
 230. York Univ. v. Can. Copyright Licensing Agency, 2020 FCA 77, 95 (2020); see 
also Brit. Broad. Corp. v. Mech.-Copyright Prot. Soc’y Ltd., 2018 EWHC 2931 (CH), 86 
(2018) (“It is common ground that the policy behind the establishment of the 
[Performing Rights Tribunal] and its transformation into the Copyright Tribunal was 
to curb the monopoly power of the collecting societies.”). 
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competitive market with all relevant information, at arm’s length and 
free of external constraints.”231 
As effective as this regulatory paradigm may be to curb monopoly 
pricing, it is ineffective in addressing the harms we identify in this 
Article: even a perfectly regulated fee for the blanket license, 
calculated to match the sum of the amounts that a radio station would 
have paid to copyright owners offering licenses in competition with 
each other, would not remedy the exclusionary impact of the blanket 
license on Other Content. Accordingly, the present regulatory response 
to the competition policy dilemma that CMOs pose may help reduce 
transfer of wealth from broadcasters to the CMO, but it does not 
remedy the exclusionary harm that the current licensing practices 
inflict on creators of Other Content, and it does not relieve the harm to 
listeners who are deprived of content that would otherwise be 
broadcast to them in a more competitive licensing environment. 
The additional harms that we identify in this Article justify, in our 
opinion, a re-evaluation of the conventional wisdom that informs the 
present regulatory paradigm and a serious consideration of whether 
the benefits of collective administration outweigh the various social 
costs. If collective administration were the only practical way to 
administer the performing rights of music (in the sense that the 
transaction costs involved in any alternative are prohibitive), then, so 
long as legislators decided to grant performing rights, the various costs 
might be regarded as unavoidable.232 However, as one of us has 
previously noted, it is far from clear that competitive licensing 
alternatives would necessarily require prohibitively high transaction 
costs in all cases.233 In fact, commercial radio would appear to provide 
 
 231. Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-42 (Can.). 
 232. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19 (1979) 
(“Although the copyright laws confer no rights on copyright owners to fix prices 
among themselves or otherwise to violate the antitrust laws, we would not expect that 
any market arrangements reasonably necessary to effectuate the rights that are granted 
would be deemed a per se violation of the Sherman Act. Otherwise, the commerce 
anticipated by the Copyright Act and protected against restraint by the Sherman Act 
would not exist at all or would exist only as a pale reminder of what Congress 
envisioned.”). 
 233. See, e.g., Ariel Katz, Copyright Collectives: Good Solution But for Which Problem? in 
WORKING WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR 
THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 19 (Harry First, Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, & Diane L. Zimmerman 
eds., 2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1416798 
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a good example of an industry where competitive alternatives could be 
easily envisaged. 
Indeed, even back in 1979, immediately after exalting the benefits 
of collective licensing and the blanket license, the U.S. Supreme Court 
noted, with respect to radio and television networks, that “the necessity 
for and advantages of a blanket license for those users may be far less 
obvious than is the case when the potential users are individual 
television or radio stations, or the thousands of other individuals and 
organizations performing copyrighted compositions in public.”234 The 
Court further noted, in a prescient footnote, that “of course changes 
brought about by new technology or new marketing techniques might 
also undercut the justification for the practice.”235 
Such new technologies and business models already exist. In 2010, 
the Copyright Board of Canada found that radio stations rely on third-
party Media Delivery Systems (MDS) to obtain new releases of music 
and that 85% of the then-surveyed stations use the Digital Media 
Delivery System (DMDS) offered by Yangaroo, Inc.236 The Board’s 
description portrays a service that resembles iTunes but with features 
designed to satisfy the needs of content owners and broadcasters.237 
According to the Board, record labels, their agents, and some 
 
(explaining that the presence of prohibitive transaction costs are not reason enough 
to prefer CMOs as the sole solution to the issue of licensing and copyright protection); 
Katz, Rethinking, supra note 11, at 572 (arguing that if alternatives to blanket licensing 
were available, broadcasters would not necessarily lose money and that current 
licensing regimes are not inherently required); Katz, New Technologies, supra note 20, 
at 246 (2006) (noting that technological developments have begun to undermine the 
reasoning behind the monopolistic control over licensing usually justified by 
prohibitive costs); Ariel Katz, Commentary: Is Collective Administration of Copyrights 
Justified by the Economic Literature?, in COMPETITION POLICY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
466 (Marcel Boyer, Michael Trebilcock & David Vaver eds., 2009), https://tspace.
library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/89454/1/Katz%20Commentary%20Collective%
20Administration.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GCZ-A749](arguing that a policy of 
exemption, for example, would be one way to prevent rising prohibitive costs as a result 
of alternatives to the natural monopoly paradigm). 
 234. Broad. Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 21. 
 235. Id. at 21 n.34. 
 236. SOCAN, Re:Sound, CMRRA-SODRAC Inc., AVLA-SOPROQ, Artisti - Tariff for 
Commercial Radio, 2008–2012, [2010] Copyright Board para. 59 (Can.) [hereinafter 
SOCAN], https://decisions.cb-cda.gc.ca/cb-cda/decisions/en/item/366711/index.
do. 
 237. Id. para. 60. 
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independent artists use the DMDS to deliver their materials to radio 
stations.238 When new content matches the radio station’s music 
format, the station may be notified.239 The station can receive a stream 
for sampling the music and may download it in a broadcast-quality 
format, which it can then integrate into its own system.240 The files 
included are encrypted and therefore cannot be used unless the 
station is an authorized user, and they include watermarking that 
allows the DMDS operator to monitor the broadcaster’s subsequent 
use of the file.241 
While Yangaroo’s DMDS functions as an efficient intermediary 
between record labels, artists, and radio stations for delivering the 
content and monitoring its use, it apparently does not grant radio 
stations the licenses they need to broadcast it.242 Those are 
administered collectively and overseen by the Copyright Board.243 
However, it is hard to see why CMOs are necessary here. Since the 
record label that produces the song must have obtained a license from 
the songwriter to do that, and since it then uses the DMDS to deliver 
the recorded song to individual radio stations, a chain of license 
agreements beginning with the songwriter and ending with the 
broadcaster is clearly present. There is no convincing reason why that 
chain of license agreements cannot include the right to authorize the 
public performance of the song by the radio station. This makes the 
DMDS a perfect example of “changes brought about by new 
technology or new marketing techniques [that] might also undercut 
the justification for the practice [of collective administration],” which 
the U.S. Supreme Court envisaged in Broadcast Music.244 
We recognize that even though the existence of new technologies 
and business models has weakened the theoretical basis for 
 
 238. Id. para. 61. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. para. 64. 
 241. Id. para. 65, 67. 
 242. See id. para. 151–52, 156, 158 (explaining that while a contractual relationship 
existed regarding the licensing of samples of music, DMDS did not have the authority 
to grant licenses directly to radio stations for the purpose of broadcasting). 
 243. See id. para. 166 (illustrating the Copyright Board’s role in setting tariffs, 
making decisions on licensing, and acting as the authority for licensing and 
distribution of copyrighted material). 
 244. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 21 (1979). 
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maintaining the current practices of collective administration of music 
in the context of commercial radio, the political economy of copyright 
may prevent or delay reforms that might seem justified and desirable. 
CMOs are not likely to volunteer to step down, copyright owners who 
presently benefit from the monopoly rents that CMOs distribute to 
them are not likely to embrace alternative models that could increase 
competition among them and between them and creators of Other 
Content, and legislators and competition regulators may not find the 
political muscle necessary to bring about such reforms. And even if 
they do, any transition from the existing models to more competitive 
ones would have to be gradual. Therefore, even if CMOs remain, we 
propose a few reforms that maintain collective administration but 
reduce some of the anticompetitive and content-distorting aspects of 
the existing licensing practices. 
The first point that we would like to make is that in commercial radio 
broadcasting, collective administration, all-you-can-eat blanket 
licensing, and license fees calculated as a percentage of revenue, have 
become so entrenched that they are treated as one and the same—as 
if the one entails the others. This conflation tends to limit the range of 
regulatory responses that may be considered. However, it would be 
useful to note that collective administration does not necessarily entail 
a blanket license, and a blanket license does not necessarily entail all-
you-can-eat pricing, and even all-you-can-eat licensing requires a 
percentage of revenue license fee. In the following sections we 
disaggregate these elements and suggest some modifications of the 
prevailing practices that could reduce some of their anticompetitive 
aspects. 
A.   Collective Administration Without a Blanket License 
If, despite the technological changes described above, collective 
administration of copyrights still presents significant cost efficiencies 
that justify the continued existence of CMOs, many of those 
efficiencies may be realized without blanket licensing. The licensing 
practices with respect to copyrighted musical works in the production 
of visual media outputs (such as films, television shows, advertisements, 
video games, etc.) provide a strong example. Synchronization Licenses 
(licenses to use a certain composition in such productions), as well as 
Master Licenses (licenses to use a particular recording), are offered to 
users through several agencies, such as Harry Fox in the United 
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States,245 CMRRA in Canada,246 or newer competitors, such as Los 
Angeles-Montreal based Third Side Music.247 Not only do these 
agencies compete against one another, importantly for our purposes, 
they do not typically offer blanket licenses but licenses for individual 
works. Prices for licenses vary based on factors such as the intended 
use of the license and the popularity of the song in question. This 
creates competition between different songs, reflects the market value 
of specific works, and encourages the use of cover versions, original 
scores, and public domain music, thus fostering varied cultural 
production. The existence of these agencies and their roles 
demonstrate that many of the cost benefits of collective administration 
may be achieved without the blanket license. 
B.   A Blanket License with Pay-Per-Use Pricing 
If the blanket license is retained, pay-per-use pricing, instead of 
license fees based as a percentage of a broadcaster’s revenue, can 
ameliorate the exclusionary impact of the current practice. Recall that 
under the common present licensing model, radio stations cannot 
realize any cost savings by substituting Other Content for Music. And the 
use of Other Content is further discouraged because even if Other Content 
might increase the station’s revenue, a percentage of that additional 
revenue would be shared with the music CMO. By contrast, a pay-per-
use pricing model would mean that a radio station could chose to 
broadcast more Other Content and less Music, reducing its spending on 
music and increasing its spending on Other Content.248 
 
 245. HARRY FOX AGENCY, https://www.harryfox.com [https://perma.cc/VE95-
PU5W]. 
 246. CANADIAN MUSICAL REPROD. RTS. AGENCY, https://www.cmrra.ca [https://
perma.cc/Y4KJ-LTSK]. 
 247. THIRD SIDE MUSIC, http://www.thirdsidemusic.com [https://perma.cc/Z8XY-
HKMS]. 
 248. It should be noted that CMOs, particularly ASCAP, currently offer a “per 
program” license, in accordance with the consent decree between ASCAP and the 
Department of Justice. A per program license is similar to the blanket license because 
it authorizes broadcasters to use all music in the repertory. The fee will vary depending 
on the specific program and how much CMO-licensed music is broadcast. This could 
be a solution for a broadcaster whose discrete programming does not require licensing 
from the CMO (because the programs have no CMO music or all CMO music 
performed has been licensed directly). The consent decree attempts to ensure that a 
per program license is not disproportionately more expensive than a regular blanket 
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A pay-per-use pricing model means that the marginal cost of playing 
another song is positive, rather than zero, which in turn, reduces the 
incentive to maximize the use of Music under the blanket license and 
the resulting distortion in the creative choices of the radio station. Pay-
per-use pricing may not directly mitigate the CMO’s market power over 
music because the price-per-song, when determined by the CMO, may 
still reflect the lack of competition among the CMO’s members. 
However, because pay-per-use allows the broadcaster to realize cost 
savings by substituting Other Content for music, it opens a source of 
potential competitive pressure on the per-use price that the CMO can 
charge. The higher the per-use price for Music is the greater the 
broadcaster’s motivation to use Other Content becomes. Accordingly, a 
pay per-use pricing scheme will reduce the exclusionary effect of the 
current licensing model. 
C.   All-You-Can-Eat Blanket License with a Fixed, Yet Adjustable, Fee 
The third alternative to the current pricing model retains the all-
you-can-eat blanket license but sets a fixed-license fee, as opposed to a 
revenue-based fee. This is, for example, the pricing model used in 
Canada by the CBC, the public broadcaster. With a fixed fee, the 
marginal cost of broadcasting another song is still zero and hence it 
does not eliminate the incentive to maximize the use of Music and 
reduce the use of Other Content. However, a fixed fee avoids the 
additional distortion that exists when the CMO is entitled to a share of 
the revenue resulting from a radio station’s decision to increase its 
revenue by broadcasting high quality. 
Making the fixed fee adjustable could improve this model, as an 
increase in the broadcast time of Other Content will reduce the fees paid 
for Music. 
 
license. See Second Amended Final Judgment at 2–4, 9, United States v. Am. Soc’y of 
Composers, Authors, & Publishers, No. 41-1395 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2001), 2001 WL 
1589999 (defining various licensing terms used in ASCAP’s consent decree and 
ordering ASCAP to offer broadcasters per-program licenses upon request). However, 
it should be noted that the per-program license is not the same as the pay per-use 
model suggested here, and it provides only a limited potential for cost savings. 
Furthermore, to take advantage of it, the broadcaster must be able to confine its use 
of ASCAP music to specific programs. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article employed an economic analysis of blanket all-you-can-
eat licenses to examine the effect of the dominant blanket-licensing 
model for the broadcast of music on the radio, and in doing so it 
demonstrated that the practice has negatively impacted the 
production of cultural content in radio broadcast. Blanket all-you-can-
eat licenses set the marginal price paid for the broadcast of each 
additional song (after the first) at zero, creating an economic incentive 
for broadcasters to use as much of the material that is included in the 
license as possible, thereby discouraging the use of other content. 
Consequently, radio broadcasters prefer pre-recorded music over any 
content that is not included in the blanket license. This includes not 
only narrated shows but even music that does not require payment 
such as public domain or music available under a Creative Commons 
license. We suggest that this understanding of the economics of CMO 
administered blanket all-you-can-eat licenses provides a novel law and 
economics explanation to two trends in radio: the historical changes 
that radio experienced in the 1950s, and the differences in content 
between present-day public and commercial radio. 
Most economic analyses of the collective administration of 
copyrighted works tend to focus on harms resulting from supra-
competitive prices as a consequence of collective administration. Our 
analysis demonstrates that in the case of music broadcast in radio, 
collective administration also causes distortions in the kind of content 
produced and broadcast. In addition, our analysis reveals that while 
collective administration might benefit one class of copyright owners, 
it does so at the expense of creators of other types of content. 
Collective administration of copyright musical works has been 
around for a century. It is so entrenched that it is sometimes seen as 
the only feasible option for licensing musical works for radio 
broadcast. Moreover, blanket all-you-can-eat licenses are often 
perceived as synonymous with collective administration, a “take it or 
leave it” bundle. But we show that that is not the case. Contrary to 
common conventions, we show that there are various options for the 
administration of copyright musical works. Copyright musical works 
can be administered by collectives, by the record labels, or by the right-
holders themselves. Furthermore, pre-recorded music can be offered 
on an all-you-can-eat or pay-per-use basis. Even if we maintain the view 
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that collective administration is the only viable option for 
administering the performing rights in musical works, if we stop 
perceiving collective administration as necessarily intertwined with all-
you-can-eat blanket licenses, we might be able to find new models for 
licensing musical works for radio broadcast that alleviate harms 
associated with blanket licensing and increase varied cultural 
production and participation. 
